RUSSIA
AP Photo
September 2008
"Russia's Recipe for Empire"
Magazine or Newspaper Article, Foreign Policy
By Monica Duffy Toft, Associate Professor of Public Policy
Russia’s recent campaign against Georgia is a textbook example of how powerful states forged empires in centuries gone by. For those who have forgotten, here’s how it’s done.
AP Photo
September 2, 2008
"Guns and Gold of August"
Op-Ed, The Korea Times
By Joseph S. Nye, Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations
"...Military force is obviously a source of hard power, but the same resource can sometimes contribute to soft power behavior. The impressive job by the American military in providing humanitarian relief after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 and the South Asian earthquake in 2005 helped restore America's attractiveness....By bombing, blockading, and occupying many parts of Georgia, delaying its withdrawal, parading blindfolded Georgian soldiers, and failing to protect Georgian citizens, Russia lost its claims to legitimacy and sowed fear and mistrust in much of the world...."
AP Photo
Summer 2008
"Identities, Interests and the Resolution of the Abkhaz Conflict"
Journal Article, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, issue 3, volume 2
By Ondrej Ditrych, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007-2008
"The recent crisis in Abkhazia reveals a fundamental qualitative change in the conflict in which the balance among three main actors is shifting, and increasingly the conflict plays a more important role in the triangular relations between Georgia, Russia and the West. The search for a new equilibrium in the conflict, one that would be an optimal outcome for the actors involved, will require rethinking the mutually constitutive roles (identities) and interests they want to assume with respect to the conflict and the entire South Caucasus...."
AP Photo
August 9, 2008
"Chinese, Russian Stall Tactics on Iran"
Op-Ed, The Boston Globe
By Joshua Gleis, Associate, International Security Program
"...The Chinese and Russians say they do not support stronger sanctions because they don't believe in their effectiveness. Off the record, however, both countries recognize that any form of sanctions that restrict their own business ventures is not going to stop the Iranians from pursuing their end goal of acquiring nuclear weapons.Thus in the meantime, the Russians and Chinese are angling themselves to maximize the economic benefits of such a precarious state of affairs in the Middle East...."
August 1, 2008
New Commission on United States Policy toward Russia
Announcement
The Belfer Center at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and The Nixon Center are pleased to announce a new Commission on United States Policy toward Russia. The commission will be co-chaired by former Senator Gary Hart and Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE).
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
July 2008
"Expanded and Accelerated HEU Downblending: Designing Options to Serve the Interests of All Parties"
Conference Paper
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
Accelerating and expanding the downblending of highly enriched uranium (HEU) beyond the current 500-ton U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement would have significant security benefits. Russia will still have large quantities of HEU not needed for military purposes after 500 tons of HEU has been blended to low-enriched uranium (LEU). But no agreement to expand and accelerate the downblending of Russian or U.S. excess HEU will succeed unless it is structured in a way that serves the interests of all sides. Russia has made clear that it has no interest in extending the HEU Purchase Agreement on its current terms. This paper outlines key Russian, U.S., and industry interests relating to expanded and accelerated HEU downblending.
Summer 2008
"The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s—A Research Note"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 33
By Pavel Podvig
The Soviet strategic modernization program of the 1970s was one of the most consequential developments of the Cold War. Deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles and the dramatic increase in the number of strategic warheads in the Soviet arsenal created a sense of vulnerability in the United States that was, to a large degree, responsible for the U.S. military buildup of the late 1970s and early 1980s and the escalation of Cold War tensions during that period. U.S. assessments concluded that the Soviet Union was seeking to achieve a capability to fight and win a nuclear war. Estimates of missile accu¬racy and silo hardness provided by the U.S. intelligence community led many in the United States to conclude that the Soviet Union was building a strategic missile force capable of destroying most U.S. missiles in a counterforce strike and of surviving a subsequent nuclear exchange. Soviet archival documents that have recently become available demonstrate that this conclusion was wrong. The U.S. estimates substantially overestimated the accuracy of the Soviet Union's missiles and the degree of silo reinforcement. As the data demonstrate, the Soviet missile force did not have the capability to launch a successful first strike. Moreover, the data strongly suggest that the Soviet Union never attempted to acquire a first-strike capability, concentrating instead on strategies based on retaliation.
June 2008
100 Grams (and Counting...): Notes from the Nuclear Underworld
Report
This report on the 2006 seizure of weapon-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) in Georgia, by journalist Michael Bronner, provides new insights on both nuclear smugglers and those trying to stop them.
AP Photo
June 13, 2008
Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order: The Role of the IAEA
Memorandum
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
The high-level Commission of Eminent Persons advising the International Atomic Energy Agency concluded that meeting the current nuclear challenges and seizing the current opportunities will require a fundamentally reinvigorated global nuclear order, featuring a strengthened IAEA with "additional authority, resources, personnel, and technology." Without a "bold agenda" of steps to strengthen the nuclear order, the Commission warned that there were real risks that terrorists might get a nuclear bomb, that a nuclear accident might occur, or that, as the UN High-Level Panel warned, the world could suffer "a cascade of nuclear proliferation." Preventing such events, the Commission emphasized, is essential for nuclear energy to grow enough to contribute to mitigating climate change, making safety, security, and nonproliferation essential foundations for nuclear energy's future.
May 5-6, 2008
"Safety, Security, Safeguards: Enabling Nuclear Energy Growth"
Presentation
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Bunn presented "Safety, Security, Safeguards: Enabling Nuclear Energy Growth" to the Global Nuclear Future Workshop at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Cambridge, Mass.
