CENTRAL ASIA
November 18, 2008
Securing the Bomb 2008
Book
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
Associate Professor of Public Policy and Project on Managing the Atom Co-Principal Investigator Matthew Bunn provides a comprehensive assessment of efforts to secure and remove vulnerable nuclear stockpiles around the world, and a detailed action plan for reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism. Securing the Bomb 2008 was commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). The full report, with additional information on the threat of nuclear terrorism, is available on the NTI website.
Summer 2008
"The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s—A Research Note"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 33
By Pavel Podvig
The Soviet strategic modernization program of the 1970s was one of the most consequential developments of the Cold War. Deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles and the dramatic increase in the number of strategic warheads in the Soviet arsenal created a sense of vulnerability in the United States that was, to a large degree, responsible for the U.S. military buildup of the late 1970s and early 1980s and the escalation of Cold War tensions during that period. U.S. assessments concluded that the Soviet Union was seeking to achieve a capability to fight and win a nuclear war. Estimates of missile accu¬racy and silo hardness provided by the U.S. intelligence community led many in the United States to conclude that the Soviet Union was building a strategic missile force capable of destroying most U.S. missiles in a counterforce strike and of surviving a subsequent nuclear exchange. Soviet archival documents that have recently become available demonstrate that this conclusion was wrong. The U.S. estimates substantially overestimated the accuracy of the Soviet Union's missiles and the degree of silo reinforcement. As the data demonstrate, the Soviet missile force did not have the capability to launch a successful first strike. Moreover, the data strongly suggest that the Soviet Union never attempted to acquire a first-strike capability, concentrating instead on strategies based on retaliation.
April 2007
"Troubled Disposition: Next Steps in Dealing With Excess Plutonium"
Magazine or Newspaper Article, Arms Control Today, issue 3, volume 37
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
Matthew Bunn argues that plutonium disposition—physically transforming it into a form that would be difficult and costly to recover for use in nuclear weapons—if carried out on a large scale would “mark a key step toward deeper and less-reversible nuclear arms reductions.” But, as he documents, delays, costs, and obstacles have plagued plutonium disposition plans in both the United States and Russia.
March 2007
"The Belfer Center and Nuclear Weapons Policy: Security in the Post-Cold War Era"
Summary, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
By Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
"The efforts that the Center has made in addressing the nuclear challenges of the post-Cold War era are anchored in the books that it has produced on the major dimensions of the problem."
February 2007
"Funding for U.S. Efforts to Improve Controls Over Nuclear Weapons, Materials, and Expertise Overseas: Recent Developments and Trends"
Paper
By Anthony Wier, Former Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2002-2007 and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier find that although threat reduction funding has had dramatic effects in reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism, the Bush administration’s proposed FY 2008 budget for cooperative threat reduction would reduce the overall funds available. They propose a number of remedies, some of which have been taken up by congress in the appropriations process.
February, 2007
Building a New Afghanistan
Book
By Robert Rotberg, Director, Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution
Named an "Outstanding Academic Title for 2007" by Choice magazine.
November 19, 2006
"Bombs That Won't Go Off"
Op-Ed, Washington Post
By Anthony Wier, Former Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2002-2007 and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
"...One piece of good news has been unfolding: While there's a great deal more to do, much of the world's potential nuclear bomb material, scattered in hundreds of buildings in dozens of countries around the world, is notably more secure than it was before Sept. 11, 2001, which means that it's harder for terrorists to steal. And the critical effort to remove such material entirely from the world's most vulnerable sites is picking up steam."
September, 2006
Averting Nuclear Catastrophe: Contemplating Extreme Responses to U.S. Vulnerability
Book Chapter
August 31, 2006
"Globalization, Terrorism, and the U.S. Relationship with Russia"
Book Chapter
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School
"Following the September 11 attacks on America, the great power relationship between the United States and Russia changed significantly...."
July 13, 2006
Securing the Bomb 2006
Report
By Anthony Wier, Former Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, 2002-2007 and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
The latest report in the ongoing MTA / NTI collaboration, Securing the Bomb 2006, finds that even though the gap between the threat of nuclear terrorism and the response has narrowed in recent years, there remains an unacceptable danger that terrorists might succeed in their quest to get and use a nuclear bomb.
