February 13, 2014
Op-Ed, Express Tribune
By Afreen Siddiqi, Visting Scholar, Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program
"Crop production in the heartlands of Pakistan — served by a massive network of canals — now increasingly relies on energy consuming groundwater pumps to meet irrigation needs. A million tube wells are reportedly installed in Punjab alone, and energy use in pumping and farm operations may account for up to one-fifth of the province's energy consumption."
November 29, 2013
Op-Ed, Washington Post
By Robert D. Blackwill, International Council Member, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Media reports of intense disagreements within the Obama administration with respect to policy toward Syria should come as no surprise. For decades, Washington policymakers and pundits have debated the right balance between America’s democratic values and its national interests.
November 12, 2013
Op-Ed, Christian Science Monitor
By Marisa L. Porges, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2012–2014
At the request of Afghan officials, Pakistan has reportedly released almost 40 Taliban combatants, supposedly to help spur peace negotiations. But experience shows this is wishful thinking. These prisoner releases give the Taliban something they want, while providing nothing in return.
October 23, 2013
Magazine or Newspaper Article, The Huffington Post
Ronak Desai, an Associate with the India and South Asia Program, reflects on the state of U.S.-Pakistan relations and its prospects for the future.
October 3, 2013
At 6:00 PM on October 3, 2013, George Perkovich, Vice President for Studies and
Director of the Nuclear Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, gave the 2013 Robert McNamara Lecture on War and Peace, titled "Preventing Nuclear War in South Asia: Unprecedented Challenges, Unprecedented Solutions."
Assessing the risk of nuclear attack-by-proxy turns on the question of whether a state could sponsor nuclear terrorism and remain anonymous. A leader could rationalize such an attack—and entrust terrorists with a vitally important mission—only if doing so allowed the sponsor to avoid retaliation. After all, if a leader did not care about retaliation, he or she would likely conduct a nuclear strike directly. Giving nuclear weapons to terrorists makes sense only if there is a high likelihood of remaining anonymous after the attack.
By Eugene B. Kogan, Director, American Secretaries of State Project
This paper studies under what conditions the U.S. can coerce its allies to forgo nuclear weapons. Specifically, why did Taiwan and South Korea give up their nuclear pursuits under American duress, while Israel and Pakistan attained a nuclear capability?
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 38
Many experts consider nuclear terrorism the single greatest threat to U.S. security. The fear that a state might transfer nuclear materials to terrorists was a core justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, more recently, for a strike against Iran’s nuclear program. The logical basis for this concern is sound: if a state could orchestrate an anonymous nuclear terror attack, it could destroy an enemy yet avoid retaliation. But how likely is it that the perpetrators of nuclear terrorism could remain anonymous? Data culled from a decade of terrorist incidents reveal that attribution is very likely after high-casualty terror attacks. Attribution rates are even higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally—97 percent for incidents in which ten or more people were killed. Moreover, tracing a terrorist group that used a nuclear weapon to its state sponsor would not be difficult, because few countries sponsor terror; few terror groups have multiple sponsors; and only one country that sponsors terrorism, Pakistan, has nuclear weapons or enough material to manufacture them. If leaders understand these facts, they will be as reluctant to give weapons to terrorists as they are to use them directly; both actions would invite devastating retaliation.
July 13, 2013
By Abbas Maleki, Associate, International Security Program
"...[T]he region offers Iran great potential to enhance rail and land transport for the exchange of local goods to form new markets. The region can also serve as a major energy hub, specifically with natural gas for Iran, China and Russia. By developing an integrative transportation system inclusive of land, air and sea, Iran could help the region connect with the Indian Ocean, the Sea of Oman and the Caspian Sea. Iran already possesses a large road and rail system that connects Khorasan with its ports in the Persian Gulf, including in Chabahar and Bandar Abbas, which it can lease to its neighbors and derive transit and customs revenues."
Talking to the Taliban: Hope over History? provides a history of attempts to talk to the Taliban. The publication of the report coincides with the announcement that the United States will begin direct negotiations with the Taliban within days. The report charts the history of talks with the Taliban and their forebears. It explains that such talks are nothing new and that contacts have existed between the Taliban and the West for many years and argues that attempts to negotiate with the Taliban since 2001 have been characterised by wishful thinking, bad timing, poor management and the 'chaos of good intentions'.