International Security (continued)
By Matthew Meselson, Co-director, Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons
"U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig, in a speech in West Berlin in September 1981 and in a detailed report to the Congress the following March, charged Soviet-backed Laotian and Vietnamese forces with waging toxin warfare against Hmong resistance fighters and their villages in Laos and against Khmer Rouge soldiers and villages in Cambodia. The charges were repeated with additional details in a further report to the Congress and to the member states of the United Nations in November 1982 by Haig's successor, Secretary of State George Shultz.
The investigation on which the allegation was based, however, failed to employ reliable methods of witness interrogation or of forensic laboratory investigation; it was further marred by the dismissal and withholding of contrary evidence and a lack of independent review. When the evidence for toxin attacks or any other form of chemical/biological warfare (CBW) was subjected to more careful examination, it could not be confirmed or was discredited. In what became known as the "Yellow Rain" affair, these charges — that toxic substances called trichothecenes were used in CBW — were initially pressed vigorously by the U.S. government and, even when the allegations proved unsustainable, they were not withdrawn...."
March 31, 2008
By Elaine Kamarck, Lecturer in Public Policy
Half of all living Americans today were born after McCain's A4E Skyhawk was shot down in an attempted bombing run on the Yen Phu power plant....his "rescuers" stripped him and beat him before handing him over to the military, which put him in Hoa Lo and then moved him around to several other prisons, where he continued to be repeatedly tortured....The Democrats can't compete with John McCain's past. But given the emergence of the millennial generation and its contributions so far to the Democratic comeback, they should be more than able to compete with John McCain for the future.
February 22, 2008
Op-Ed, San Francisco Chronicle
By Xiaohui (Anne) Wu, Former Associate, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2007–2010; Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2004–2007
"...while relations with "problematic" countries have soured when the United States and some European nations insisted on carrying a big stick, it is wiser for China not to burn its bridges. If China had signed on to coercive diplomacy, countries such as Sudan, Burma and North Korea would not have listened, and there would have been no way for China to serve as a constructive messenger. China's power looks muscular, but it stands to lose those muscles once they are flexed."
February 12, 2008
Op-Ed, The Bangkok Post
By Jason Qian and Xiaohui (Anne) Wu, Former Associate, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2007–2010; Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2004–2007
"China would want to avoid choosing sides in Burma, so as not to compromise its holistic interests. A more effective route is to manage relations with all to maximise common interest. To achieve this, the motto of 'there are no permanent friends or enemies in international relations' is the key....As in the case of North Korea, China does not want the problems of a neighbour like Burma spilling over into its own territory. Burma is also part of China's strategic configuration with other regional and international players."
January 18, 2008
By Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs; Faculty Chair, International Security Program
"...a realist would be a valuable antidote to the self-righteous hubris that pervades contemporary U.S. commentary on foreign affairs, an attitude that has encouraged many of the policies that have undermined America's image around the globe. A realist would also cast a skeptical eye on virtually all of the current presidential candidates, whose views on foreign policy do not stray far from the current neoconservative/liberal consensus. Realists aren't infallible and some readers will undoubtedly object to their views, but that's hardly the issue. The point is that Americans would be better informed if they regularly heard what realists had to say, and media institutions that are genuinely interested in presenting a diverse array of views should be signing up a few of them."
December 11, 2007
By Alexander Vuving, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2005-2007; Former Associate, International Security Program, 2007-2008
This paper argues that the current structure of international power in Asia is transitional. But neither hegemony nor multipolarity will likely be the next Asian order. The paper then assesses the prospects of the emerging regional order in Asia in terms of four options: bipolarity, the East Asian Community, U.S.-China condominium, and shared leadership. The paper concludes by discussing how Southeast Asian countries should prepare for the future strategic environment.
November 17, 2007
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
"WHEN TWO of Asia's most prominent female politicians are under house arrest at the same time, it's easy to draw parallels. The scary part: comparing the off and on detention of Pakistan's Benazir Bhutto with the longstanding house arrest of Burma's Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma makes Pakistan look good. But in both cases, this is no time for complacency on the part of the international community...."
Since the 1990s, Asia-Pacific countries have changed their approaches to security cooperation and regional order. The end of the Cold War, the resurgence of China, the Asian economic crisis, and the events of September 11, 2001, have all contributed to important changes in the Asia-Pacific security architecture.
"Modes of Regional Conflict Management: Comparing Security Cooperation in the Korean Peninsula, China-Taiwan, and the South China Sea"
By Rosemary Foot, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2005-2006
"Analysts focusing on the prospects for inter-state war or peace in the Asia-Pacific invariably have pointed to the Korean Peninsula (KP), China/Taiwan (CT), and the South China Sea (SCS) conflicts as the potential "flash points" or "hot spots" of the region...."
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 32
Forty years after its inception, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, rather than representing an integrated economic, security, and regional community, essentially remains a conglomerate of diverse states maintaining order in Southeast Asia through a complex bureaucratic process. Inviolable national sovereignty, a refusal to use force, and a desire to avoid confrontation among its members dominate the group’s policies and limit its political role. The result is a secretariat that lacks an overarching capacity to enforce its policies, as an analysis of ASEAN’s responses to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia, and the rise of China demonstrates. ASEAN is only as strong as its member states want it to be, and too often states put individual goals above a common one.