International Security (continued)
February 13, 2008
Op-Ed, Cypress Mail
By Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
"European countries’ success in overcoming centuries of animosity, and the development of a large internal market, has given them a great deal of soft power. At the Cold War’s end, East European countries did not try to form local alliances, as they did in the 1920s, but looked toward Brussels to secure their future. Similarly, countries like Turkey and Ukraine have adjusted their policies in response to their attraction to Europe."
Journal Article, Security Studies, issue 1, volume 17
By Timothy Crawford, Former Associate, International Security Program, 2006-2009
It is hard to imagine that any British leader in 1940 — let alone Winston Churchill — would venture to appease another Fascist dictator in Europe. But when it came to British relations with Franco's Spain Churchill doggedly pursued a wedge strategy that hinged on offers to reward and accommodate Madrid. And the results were impressive. As Britain faced the Nazi menace alone in 1940–41, Spain's government remained non-belligerent, despite it's ideological affinity and historical debt to the Axis powers, and despite its opportunity to re-claim Gibraltar and parts of Morocco with Nazi help. This surprising outcome was no minor feat, for Spain's non-belligerence in 1940 had enormous implications for the future course and duration of the conflict. The deviant case of Spain in 1940 is thus important not only because leading alliance theories do not explain it, but also because it made a big difference in the biggest war of the 20th century. This article revisits the history of this critical juncture of the war, and sets forth a theoretical framework for understanding the role of wedge strategy in the case, and in international security more generally.
By Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
"It is generally agreed that the United States is the leading power at the beginning of the twenty-first century, but there is less agreement on how long this will last. Some observers argue that American pre-eminence is simply the result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and that this 'unipolar moment' will be brief, while others argue that America's power is so great that it will last for much of the coming century...."
Journal Article, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Special Section: Preparing for a Soviet Occupation: The Strategy of 'Stay-Behind', issue 6, volume 30
By Charles G. Cogan, Associate, International Security Program
Stay-behind networks in France were set up starting in 1948 and were aimed at responding to the possibility of a Soviet armed attack into Western Europe. Participants were identified, and arms and explosives cached, to be activated in case of hostilities.
"On Classifying Terrorism: A Potential Contribution of Cluster Analysis for Academics and Policymakers"
Journal Article, Defense and Security Analysis, issue 4, volume 23
The authors argue that classifying terrorist groups based on their motivations (i.e. Islamic, nationalist-separatist, left-wing, etc) causes analysts to ignore important similarities between such groups. This article suggests using cluster analysis to classify terrorist groups based on their motives and their tactics. Using the U.S. State Department's list of Significant Terrorist Incidents through 2003, the authors demonstrate that trends in terrorist attacks among groups with seemingly disparate motives and locations provide insights into dynamic nature of terrorism over the past several decades. Specifically, certain terrorist incidents in places as diverse as Lebanon, Georgia, and Colombia have more in common than is typically suspected, suggesting that such groups monitor and learn from one another's activities.
November 26, 2007
Björn Bjarnason is Minister of Justice for the Republic of Iceland, and a number of his responsibilities relate to domestic and external security — analogous to those of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. His lecture addressed security issues relating to maritime activity in the North Atlantic and the changing profile of these maritime security issues due to climate change and the increased exploitation of oil and gas in the Arctic.
Journal Article, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, issue 4, volume 5
By Abbas Maleki, Associate, International Security Program
Energy diversification has emerged as one of the most important priorities for a majority of the European countries and the EU. Growing energy demand in Europe combined with a high reliance on Russia as an energy producer have led the EU to look to the Caspian Sea region for alternative energy resources, especially in natural gas. Iran has the 2nd largest natural gas reserves in the world and could assist Europe in diversifying supplies. This article argues that there is substantial potential for energy cooperation between Iran and the European countries, particularly Turkey. Increased Iranian participation in the Eurasian energy market, both as consumer and producer, could lead to other benefits including economic development and more efficient energy extraction.
This chapter describes disposition options and assesses the Russian and U.S. programs. The discussion is also relevant to the problem of disposing of the world's growing stocks of separated civil plutonium —especially in the United Kingdom, which currently has no disposition plan.
Journal Article, International Security, issue 2, volume 32
New historical evidence reveals that World War I, far from being accidental, was provoked by German leaders who hoped to dominate the European continent, fully aware that the conflict would be long and bloody. They did not have a blueprint for quick victory embodied in the Schlieffen Plan; they did not misjudge the nature of modern war; and they did not lose control of events and attack out of fear of their enemies moving first. This new historiography challenges the core concepts of defensive realism and calls for a reinterpretation of the war as it relates to causes of conflict.
Journal Article, The SAIS Review of International Affairs, issue 2, volume XXVII
By Boaz Atzili, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2006-2008
Today, territorial ownership of states is essentially fixed, in marked contrast to earlier periods in history. This change has affected states in two very different ways. In regions in which most states are socio-politically strong, fixed territorial ownership is a blessing. It enhances peace, stability, and cooperation between states. In regions in which most states are socio-politically weak, however, fixed territorial ownership is largely a curse. It perpetuates and exacerbates states' weakness, and contributes to internal conflicts that often spill overacross international borders.