Nuclear Issues (continued)
By Mansour Salsabili, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
Ambiguity in Iran's weapon acquisition dynamics exacerbates mistrust, which is the core reason for the present standoff at the negotiating table. This paper elucidates the Iranian military's capability and intention by delving into the main componential elements of weapon acquisition.
February 21, 2013
Op-Ed, Washington Post
By David Ignatius, Senior Fellow, Future of Diplomacy Project
"Mohammad Khazaee, Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations, took questions this week at an unusual forum hosted by the Asia Society. Critics argued that the forum was simply an opportunity for Iranian propaganda, but as moderator of the discussion, I thought it made an important, if somewhat discouraging, point: There isn’t yet sufficient trust on either side for a broad agreement," writes David Ignatius for the Washington Post.
March 15, 2013
Op-Ed, Policy Watch
Talks with Iran in Turkey next week and in Kazakhstan next month are important, but Tehran still needs to clarify the details of its controversial nuclear program.
March 6, 2013
By Tytti Erästö, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"The problem is that, from an Iranian perspective, recent offers fail to suggest that the zero enrichment demand would not be reasserted; sanctions continue to be based on it and the P5+1 continue to refuse to recognize Iran's right to enrichment. The resulting vagueness about end goals is reinforced by the absence of any apparent intention to lift the tightening Western sanctions as part of a potential nuclear deal."
January 22, 2013
The establishment of a WMDFZ in the Middle East is a real challenge for the international community taking into consideration the absence of favorable conditions such as the mutual states recognitions as political entities with established diplomatic relations, and stability. To start with, there is no one single model for existing Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ). Each existing NWFZ treaty had introduced elements, including creative legal arrangements, and unique features depending on the specificities of each zone. The current treaties of the South Pacific NWFZ, the Southeast Asian NWFZ, the African NWFZ, the Latin American NWFZ, and the Central Asian NWFZ, can be studied and applied where relevant. So, too, there exist organizations responsible for the verification of these treaties (IAEA, OPCW, CTBTO). The case of the Middle East will be more complex since the treaty is envisioned to cover all weapons of mass destruction including biological and chemical as well as their delivery vehicles. A large number of political, historical, technical, and verification issues need to be factored into the Treaty. In other words, working on a WMDFZ means the necessity to deal with all WMD aspects together. Progressing the WMDFZ further means looking at a composite picture of states’ concerns and relations in the region that just counting weapons reduction alone.
January 29, 2013
By James F. Smith, Communications Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Gary Samore, President Obama’s Coordinator for Weapons of Mass Destruction Counter-Terrorism and Arms Control, has been appointed Executive Director (Research) for Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. A former fellow with the Belfer Center's International Security Program, Samore has served for the past four years as the principal advisor to the President on all matters relating to arms control and the prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and WMD terrorism.
January 29, 2013
Op-Ed, Christian Science Monitor
By Mahsa Rouhi, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
"The foundations of a Turkey-Japan negotiation with Iran have been laid in decades of dialogue with Tehran and long-established relations focused on energy supplies. Most important, Turkey and Japan continue to maintain strong trade relations with Tehran, which allows them to include economic incentives in a potential proposal. The P5+1 cannot offer such incentives unless they lift a number of sanctions, which seems highly unlikely at the first stage."
January 15, 2013
Op-Ed, The Nautilus Institute
By Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
In this short report Olli Heinonen addresses critical monitoring and verification issues arising from Morton Halperin’s proposal for a nuclear weapons free zone as a new approach for the security in Northeast Asia.
December 24, 2012
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
By Juliette Kayyem, Lecturer in Public Policy
"The never-ending negotiations about the pending fiscal cliff sometimes amount to nothing more than a dizzying array of numbers. Who can count that high? The negotiations also make us think that the only stastistics that mattered in 2012, or will matter in 2013, involve dollar signs. A year in pictures may be compelling and beautiful, but the year in numbers gives a strong hint of what to anticipate in the year ahead."
How can the states of the Middle East begin to create the political conditions for achieving sustained progress toward the elimination of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons? This paper examines the challenges and obstacles that the parties of the region will need to overcome to bring a WMD-free zone into force, and recommends near-term steps for improving regional security.