Nuclear Issues (continued)
This chapter assesses whether terrorists are actually seeking nuclear weapons; whether a terrorist organization could, if it had the needed nuclear materials, be capable of building a nuclear bomb; whether terrorist organizations could plausibly get the needed nuclear materials; and what the consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack might be. The chapter then describes the substantial progress made in reducing the risk of nuclear theft in recent years and the gaps that still remain. Finally, the chapter offers suggestions for strengthening nuclear security for the long haul.
June 30, 2015
Magazine or Newspaper Article, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
By Ariane Tabatabai, Former Associate, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2014–2015; Former Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2013–2014
A discussion of the state of play in the apparent final days of the Iranian nuclear negotiations and the stumbling blocks remaining on the path toward a final deal
By William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
A good nuclear agreement with Iran requires that we know first, what work has Iran conducted toward nuclear weapons, and second, can we guarantee that Iran has stopped and will not resume this work. If these questions are not answered correctly and completely before the negotiations conclude, the resulting agreement will be illusory.
Monday, June 29, 2015
Op-Ed, The Telegraph
By Nawaf Obaid, Visiting Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
As the June 30 deadline approaches for the P5+1 - a group of nations including the US, Russia and China - and Iran to complete a nuclear agreement, all signs seem to be pointing to the fact that Britain alongside the US and France seem to be caving in on some of their long-standing central demands. Foremost among these is that Iran must be transparent about the “possible military dimensions” (PMDs) of its nuclear program.
June 28, 2015
Magazine or Newspaper Article, The New York Times
Iran’s top nuclear negotiator was heading back to Tehran on Sunday to consult with his nation’s leadership, as negotiators remained divided over how to limit and monitor Tehran’s nuclear program and even on how to interpret the preliminary agreement they reached two months ago.
June 26, 2015
Op-Ed, The National Interest
By Albert Carnesale, Member of the Board, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
The parties to the talks over Iran’s nuclear program seek to reach an agreement by the self-imposed (and therefore extendable) deadline of the end of this month. No agreement has yet been reached, and statements made by the various parties provide an incomplete and not entirely consistent picture of the basic provisions to be included. Nevertheless, the question most hotly debated among political leaders and pundits is: “Is this a good deal?” The logical response to this question is: “Compared to what?”
Almost all of those who maintain that the emerging agreement is not a good deal have as their basis for comparison “a better deal.” But that’s of no practical use. Everyone would prefer a deal that they judge to be better than the one that appears to be emerging. Disagreements arise over what would constitute a better deal and over the feasibility of achieving it.
June 24, 2015
By Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Unfettered access to sites, facilities, material, equipment, people, and documents is imperative to the credible long-term verification of any nuclear agreement with Iran. This “anywhere, anytime” access and short notice inspections must not be subject to a dispute resolution mechanism, which would delay the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) access.
June 24, 2015
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
Belfer Center Director Graham Allison testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on "Lessons Learned from Past WMD Negotiations" to inform assessment of a comprehensive nuclear deal that will prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
By Gary Samore, Executive Director for Research, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
To assist Members of Congress and observers in analyzing these issues and judging a potential comprehensive agreement, the Belfer Center prepared this brief to outline the key facets of sanctions against Iran. Written as an addendum to our April policy brief, ‘Decoding the Iran Nuclear Deal,’ this report is driven by the policy debate’s leading questions.
June 24, 2015
Op-Ed, The New York Times
By David E. Sanger, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School
Five former members of President Obama’s inner circle of Iran advisers have written an open letter expressing concern that a pending accord to stem Iran’s nuclear program “may fall short of meeting the administration’s own standard of a ‘good’ agreement” and laying out a series of minimum requirements that Iran must agree to in coming days for them to support a final deal.