By Brenda Shaffer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1999Ė2007; Former Research Director, Caspian Studies Program, 2000Ė2005; Former Research Director, Caspian Studies Project, 2005Ė2007
In this incisive Policy Paper, Caspian Basin specialist Brenda Shaffer presents a comprehensive overview of how Russia and Iran view each other, providing a detailed explanation of why Russia does not share all U.S. concerns about Iranian actions. Using her rich command of the Russian literature on Iran, the author argues that because Russia views its relations and cooperation with Iran as vital to national security, it will not jeopardize those relations for the sake of short-term material incentives or out of fear of U.S. condemnation.
"The most important book by any ex-Clinton official."
-Thomas L. Friedman, The New York Times (April 16, 1999)
By Miriam Elman, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1993-1994, 1995-1996, 1999-2001
Many political scientists have hailed the apparent existence of Democratic Peace--the absence of wars between democracies--as proof that a world of democracies would be a world without war. This idea challenges traditional approaches to international politics, which focus on the balance of power between states regardless of their political systems. It also has important implications for world politics, especially as President Clinton has made the promotion of democracy a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy on the grounds that democracies never fight each other.
By Shai Feldman, Member of the Board, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
The political dimensions of the Arab-Israeli relationship have changed dramatically in recent years. Israel and its Arab neighbors have made remarkable progress toward resolving long-standing conflicts. In Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East, Shai Feldman considers whether these political breakthroughs have set the stage for agreements on controlling nuclear weapons in the region. He presents a richly detailed overview of the current situation and lays out an agenda for future efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war in the Middle East.
By Robert Rotberg, Director, Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution
"An exciting and wide-ranging exploration of the myths and narratives that lie behind the unresolved Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts...Anyone dedicated to the fullest possible understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will want to read this volume cover-to-cover."
---Neil Caplan, Vanier College, Montreal
By Marisa L. Porges, Research Fellow, International Security Program
Faced with an extremist prisoner population numbered in the thousands, Saudi officials developed tools intending to prevent prisoner radicalization, to mitigate the risk when an alleged or convicted terrorist was released, and to deal with domestic political concerns about prisoner treatment. What emerged was a unique and highly tailored approach that included rehabilitation-oriented programs in prisons and at prisoner rehabilitation centers, and 'aftercare' support for recently released prisoners.
Oct 2, 2013
By Robert Reardon, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
Iran may already possess the ability to produce nuclear weapons, but for the time being Tehran appears content to continue gradually advancing its nuclear program while remaining within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.†This book chapter assesses Iranís potential to develop nuclear weapons, the nature of its nuclear decision-making, and the possible policy implications of Iranís nuclear choices.
April 2, 2013
By Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
During the last two decades, there have been successes but also disappointments in fighting against nuclear proliferation. On the positive side, we witnessed the dismantlement of nuclear weapons programs in South Africa, Iraq, and Libya.
April 1, 2013
By Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
This chapter summarizes the case that it is plausible that sophisticated terrorist groups could make a nuclear bomb if they got the nuclear material; that some terrorist groups have actively tried to get nuclear bombs in the past, and some groups are likely to try again in the future; and that unless urgent action is taken to improve nuclear security, it is plausible that terrorists might be able to get the potential nuclear bomb material they would need.