NORTH KOREA -- NUCLEAR PROGRAM
AP Photo
May 2013
"North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Future Strategy and Doctrine"
Policy Brief
By Terence Roehrig, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
A nuclear North Korea makes it crucial that all countries in Northeast Asia work hard at maintaining a stable security environment that avoids the dangers of a crisis while encouraging North Korea to adopt a nuclear strategy that retains its "no first use" pledge, a strong command and control system, and a stable nuclear weapons posture. Given its relationship with North Korea, China is best positioned to encourage DPRK leaders in these directions.
April 18, 2013
"Dealing with North Korea—What Comes Next?"
Op-Ed, Diplomat
By Terence Roehrig, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"A military strike against North Korean nuclear facilities would be very dangerous, possibly setting off a chain of events that could wreck the peninsula. South Korea has made absolutely clear that it will retaliate if North Korea initiates some type of provocation but a direct military strike to eliminate its nuclear program is unlikely. Finally, despite some indications of unhappiness with Pyongyang's actions, there are limits to what China is willing to do to exert pressure on North Korea."
March 25, 2013
"North Korea Stirs Cuban Crisis Memory"
Op-Ed, Asia Times
By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
"President Barack Obama and Kim Jong-eun could end up confronting each other 'eyeball to eyeball', each with nuclear weapons on hair trigger, as president John F Kennedy and Nikita Khruschev did over five decades ago during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. However, the younger and less-experienced Kim of the smaller and isolated Kingdom might not behave as rationally as Khruschev."
AP Photo
March 6, 2013
"China's North Korea Dilemma"
Op-Ed, Los Angeles Times
By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
"From China's perspective, the crisis is driven by Washington and Pyongyang. North Korea is unlikely to give up its nuclear ambitions until it gets from the U.S. what it covets most: a reliable security assurance. This would mean an end to Washington's pursuit of regime change. If Washington does not move in this direction, Pyongyang will continue to escalate the crisis. Any resolution of the impasse has to address the reasonable security concerns of North Korea."
February 20, 2013
"Not So Fast: Pyongyang's Nuclear Weapons Ambitions"
Op-Ed, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
By Dana Struckman and Terence Roehrig, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"While concern for North Korea's push to become a relevant nuclear power is warranted, it is equally important to recognize the very serious technical issues that have plagued Pyongyang's efforts to date. Building a nuclear weapon and its delivery system, and then keeping them operational for the long term is hard—even harder for those states attempting to do it under the umbrella of international sanctions and monitoring."
February 15, 2013
"North Korea's Third Nuclear Test: Plutonium or Highly Enriched Uranium?"
Op-Ed, Power & Policy Blog
By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
"North Korea has only a small supply of plutonium—material that it had stopped producing by 2008—and had more recently demonstrated an operational capability to enrich uranium, which would support a much larger arsenal of weapons given North Korea's huge deposits of natural uranium.... However, the seismic signals are useless in this regard. The question is, then, can the off-site environmental sampling analysis distinguish a plutonium explosion from a HEU explosion?"
AP Photo
January 2013
"Deciphering North Korea's New Year's Address: The Real Road Ahead"
News
By John S. Park, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
Kim Jong-eun's New Year's Day address signaled a willingness to ease tensions with South Korea and focus on economic development, but how credible is this message? Project on Managing the Atom Associate and MIT Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow John Park analyzes the address in an HKS PolicyCast.
AP Photo
December 2012
"The Leap in North Korea's Ballistic Missile Program: The Iran Factor"
Policy Brief
By John S. Park, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
John S. Park, Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Project on Managing the Atom Associate, argues that cooperation between North Korea and Iran has been a critical—yet underexamined—enabler of North Korea's recent success. He concludes that the time has come for the United States to view the two previously independent missile programs as two sides of the same coin and recommends strategies for disrupting the procurement channels between Iran and North Korea.
November 2012
"Antiproliferation: Tackling Proliferation by Engaging the Private Sector"
Discussion Paper
By Ian J. Stewart, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
Illicit trade from the international marketplace plays a direct role in sustaining the nuclear and missile programs of several countries, including Iran, in defiance of UN sanctions. This paper sets out what measures the private sector should take in order to manage the legal, financial and reputational risks associated with involvement in proliferation-related trade, and makes recommendations to national authorities for how for how to help the private sector identify and prevent potential proliferation.
October 2012
"North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program: Motivations, Strategy, and Doctrine"
Book Chapter
By Terence Roehrig, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
Despite continuing efforts to convince North Korea to relinquish its nuclear capability, it appears increasingly unlikely that it will ever do so. Pyongyang might be willing to curtail or freeze certain parts of the program but the likelihood of North Korean denuclearization is quickly fading. With Pyongyang likely to retain some level of nuclear-weapons capability, analysis turns to an assessment of how these weapons might be integrated into its defense posture. Using deterrence theory as the analytical framework, this chapter examines possible avenues for North Korea's nuclear weapons strategy and doctrine.
