NORTH KOREA -- NUCLEAR PROGRAM
March 18, 2013
"North Korea’s Nuclear Test of China"
Op-Ed
By William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
The most recent North Korean nuclear detonation is as much a test of China’s foreign policy as it was of the DPRK’s ability to induce atomic fission. It exposes outdated assumptions and policies, and the pernicious effects of China’s mushrooming foreign trade and investment in North Korea. Beijing’s relations with Pyongyang are guided by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which still thinks of the 1950 conflict as “the war to resist America and aid Korea.” The policy that China and North Korea should be as close as “lips and teeth” is a relic of the Cold War. The notion that North Korea could or should somehow act as a “buffer state” in an era of air power and massive Chinese trade with the South is equally archaic. Click the link below for the full text of this article:
AP Photo
March 6, 2013
"China's North Korea Dilemma"
Op-Ed, Los Angeles Times
By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
"From China's perspective, the crisis is driven by Washington and Pyongyang. North Korea is unlikely to give up its nuclear ambitions until it gets from the U.S. what it covets most: a reliable security assurance. This would mean an end to Washington's pursuit of regime change. If Washington does not move in this direction, Pyongyang will continue to escalate the crisis. Any resolution of the impasse has to address the reasonable security concerns of North Korea."
February 20, 2013
"Not So Fast: Pyongyang's Nuclear Weapons Ambitions"
Op-Ed, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
By Dana Struckman and Terence Roehrig, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"While concern for North Korea's push to become a relevant nuclear power is warranted, it is equally important to recognize the very serious technical issues that have plagued Pyongyang's efforts to date. Building a nuclear weapon and its delivery system, and then keeping them operational for the long term is hard—even harder for those states attempting to do it under the umbrella of international sanctions and monitoring."
February 15, 2013
"North Korea's Third Nuclear Test: Plutonium or Highly Enriched Uranium?"
Op-Ed, Power & Policy Blog
By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
"North Korea has only a small supply of plutonium—material that it had stopped producing by 2008—and had more recently demonstrated an operational capability to enrich uranium, which would support a much larger arsenal of weapons given North Korea's huge deposits of natural uranium.... However, the seismic signals are useless in this regard. The question is, then, can the off-site environmental sampling analysis distinguish a plutonium explosion from a HEU explosion?"
AP Images
February 12, 2013
"North Korea's Lesson: Nukes for Sale"
Op-Ed, New York Times
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
THE most dangerous message North Korea sent Tuesday with its third nuclear weapon test is: nukes are for sale. Graham Allison writes in the New York Times that the real significance of North Korea's overnight nuclear test is that this particular test was, in the estimation of American officials, most likely fueled by highly enriched uranium, not the plutonium that served as the core of North Korea’s earlier tests. "Testing a uranium-based bomb would announce to the world — including potential buyers — that North Korea is now operating a new, undiscovered production line for weapons-usable material."
January 29, 2013
President Obama's WMD "Czar" Appointed Executive Director of Belfer Center
News
By James F. Smith, Communications Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Gary Samore, President Obama’s Coordinator for Weapons of Mass Destruction Counter-Terrorism and Arms Control, has been appointed Executive Director (Research) for Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. A former fellow with the Belfer Center's International Security Program, Samore has served for the past four years as the principal advisor to the President on all matters relating to arms control and the prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and WMD terrorism.
AP Photo
January 2013
"Deciphering North Korea's New Year's Address: The Real Road Ahead"
News
By John S. Park, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
Kim Jong-eun's New Year's Day address signaled a willingness to ease tensions with South Korea and focus on economic development, but how credible is this message? Project on Managing the Atom Associate and MIT Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow John Park analyzes the address in an HKS PolicyCast.
AP Photo
December 2012
"The Leap in North Korea's Ballistic Missile Program: The Iran Factor"
Policy Brief
By John S. Park, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
John S. Park, Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Project on Managing the Atom Associate, argues that cooperation between North Korea and Iran has been a critical—yet underexamined—enabler of North Korea's recent success. He concludes that the time has come for the United States to view the two previously independent missile programs as two sides of the same coin and recommends strategies for disrupting the procurement channels between Iran and North Korea.
November 2012
"Antiproliferation: Tackling Proliferation by Engaging the Private Sector"
Discussion Paper
By Ian J. Stewart, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
Illicit trade from the international marketplace plays a direct role in sustaining the nuclear and missile programs of several countries, including Iran, in defiance of UN sanctions. This paper sets out what measures the private sector should take in order to manage the legal, financial and reputational risks associated with involvement in proliferation-related trade, and makes recommendations to national authorities for how for how to help the private sector identify and prevent potential proliferation.
October 2012
"North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program: Motivations, Strategy, and Doctrine"
Book Chapter
By Terence Roehrig, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
Despite continuing efforts to convince North Korea to relinquish its nuclear capability, it appears increasingly unlikely that it will ever do so. Pyongyang might be willing to curtail or freeze certain parts of the program but the likelihood of North Korean denuclearization is quickly fading. With Pyongyang likely to retain some level of nuclear-weapons capability, analysis turns to an assessment of how these weapons might be integrated into its defense posture. Using deterrence theory as the analytical framework, this chapter examines possible avenues for North Korea's nuclear weapons strategy and doctrine.
