NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR PROGRAM
February 24, 2014
Op-Ed, International Relations and Security Network
By William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
The Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been remarkably successful in restraining the nuclear ambitions of most states, writes William Tobey. If it is to succeed in the future, he says, the ‘best’ must uphold their convictions while the ‘worst’ must recognize that proliferation is ultimately a dead end.
December 13, 2013
Op-Ed, Power & Policy Blog
By John S. Park, Faculty Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
"With the elimination of Jang and the dismantling of his lucrative patronage system, there will be setbacks in Sino-DPRK commercial interactions that will decrease the generation of funds for the Kim regime. In order to fill these funding gaps, it's now more likely that the Kim regime may try to increase revenues from illicit activities like WMD-related sales."
Newsletter Article, Belfer Center Newsletter
As an American diplomat, Stephen Bosworth stared down dictators (Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines) and cajoled repressive regimes (North Korea). Then he had a second career as dean of Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. But he wasn’t able to retreat to the quiet halls of academia. President Obama appointed him the U.S. special envoy on North Korea, a role he filled from 2009 to 2011 even while he was leading the Fletcher School.
James F. Smith, director of communications for the Belfer Center, interviewed newly appointed senior fellow Stephen Bosworth for this profile.
November 25, 2013
Each year, the Science, Technology, and Public Policy (STPP) Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School welcomes new pre- and post-doctoral fellows and visiting researchers to a select team of scholars exploring the critical role that science and technology play in everyday life.
November 24, 2013
Magazine or Newspaper Article, GlobalPost
By Nicholas Burns, Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations, Harvard Kennedy School
Iran and six world powers clinched a deal on Sunday curbing the Iranian nuclear program in exchange for initial sanctions relief. Sounds pretty good, but of course nothing is that simple and already Israel has called it a "historic mistake." Which is it? And what's going to happen next? Harvard Kennedy School professor and GlobalPost senior foreign affairs columnist, Nicholas Burns, weighs in.
October 27, 2013
Op-Ed, The New York Times
As officials in charge of American policy toward North Korea during the Clinton and Obama administrations, we met last month in Europe with senior representatives of the North Korean government to discuss relations between our countries. We believe that the current impasse, which only buys time for North Korea to develop its nuclear program, is unstable and that matters will only get worse if not addressed directly. It’s time for the Obama administration to reopen dialogue with Pyongyang.
October 18, 2013
"In Response to Recent Questionable Claims about North Korea’s Indigenous Production of Centrifuges"
Op-Ed, India & Global Affairs
After reading the summary paper presented at a conference in Seoul on September 25, 2013, “New insights into North Korea’s gas centrifuge enrichment program” by Joshua Pollack, with the aid of R. Scott Kemp, we remain unconvinced about its central conclusions. In particular, we disagree with several that have been widely reported in the media, such as that policies based on export controls, sanctions and interdiction “won’t get much traction” and a verifiable denuclearization deal may be “out of reach.”1 We have identified several problems from the summary of the forthcoming analysis which would undermine those as well as other conclusions they draw.
July 15, 2013
Op-Ed, Moscow Times
By Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
"China was sincere in expressing its desire for a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula, but the nuclear issue was not its primary concern. It also sought to prevent the collapse of the North Korean regime and the resulting potential for chaos on its border — not only flows of refugees, but also the possibility that South Korean or U.S. troops could move into North Korea."
July 14, 2013
By David Nusbaum, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
A long-standing goal of diplomacy with Iran is persuading Iran to suspend its enrichment operations while it clarifies its past activities and while negotiations proceed on a more permanent resolution to the nuclear crisis. However, there is problem in using suspension of nuclear material production as a negotiating step: The technical details of suspension have never been clearly defined. The international community needs to be aware of the diversion risks during a suspension of enrichment activities and should mitigate these risks by including the necessary verification measures during negotiations and signing of any agreement on suspension.
July 12, 2013
By Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
The 45-year-old NPT anchors states’ commitment to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy to nuclear weapons. The IAEA’s 40-year-old Model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) premises its verification standard on the early detection of diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or purposes unknown. The Agency’s mission in ensuring that nuclear uses remain solely peaceful has been challenged and remains the case in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. There are lessons to be drawn from the IAEA’s inspection process concerning these countries, and in that context, future adjustments of safeguards methods to consider.