NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR PROGRAM
October 27, 2013
Op-Ed, The New York Times
As officials in charge of American policy toward North Korea during the Clinton and Obama administrations, we met last month in Europe with senior representatives of the North Korean government to discuss relations between our countries. We believe that the current impasse, which only buys time for North Korea to develop its nuclear program, is unstable and that matters will only get worse if not addressed directly. It’s time for the Obama administration to reopen dialogue with Pyongyang.
October 18, 2013
"In Response to Recent Questionable Claims about North Korea’s Indigenous Production of Centrifuges"
Op-Ed, India & Global Affairs
After reading the summary paper presented at a conference in Seoul on September 25, 2013, “New insights into North Korea’s gas centrifuge enrichment program” by Joshua Pollack, with the aid of R. Scott Kemp, we remain unconvinced about its central conclusions. In particular, we disagree with several that have been widely reported in the media, such as that policies based on export controls, sanctions and interdiction “won’t get much traction” and a verifiable denuclearization deal may be “out of reach.”1 We have identified several problems from the summary of the forthcoming analysis which would undermine those as well as other conclusions they draw.
July 15, 2013
Op-Ed, Moscow Times
By Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
"China was sincere in expressing its desire for a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula, but the nuclear issue was not its primary concern. It also sought to prevent the collapse of the North Korean regime and the resulting potential for chaos on its border — not only flows of refugees, but also the possibility that South Korean or U.S. troops could move into North Korea."
July 14, 2013
By David Nusbaum, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, 2013–2016; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2011–2013
A long-standing goal of diplomacy with Iran is persuading Iran to suspend its enrichment operations while it clarifies its past activities and while negotiations proceed on a more permanent resolution to the nuclear crisis. However, there is problem in using suspension of nuclear material production as a negotiating step: The technical details of suspension have never been clearly defined. The international community needs to be aware of the diversion risks during a suspension of enrichment activities and should mitigate these risks by including the necessary verification measures during negotiations and signing of any agreement on suspension.
July 12, 2013
By Olli Heinonen, Senior Associate, Managing the Atom Project
The 45-year-old NPT anchors states’ commitment to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy to nuclear weapons. The IAEA’s 40-year-old Model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) premises its verification standard on the early detection of diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or purposes unknown. The Agency’s mission in ensuring that nuclear uses remain solely peaceful has been challenged and remains the case in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. There are lessons to be drawn from the IAEA’s inspection process concerning these countries, and in that context, future adjustments of safeguards methods to consider.
June 5, 2013
By James F. Smith, Former Communications Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Ambassador Stephen W. Bosworth, who transformed Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy during his 12 years as dean, is joining Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs as a senior fellow. Belfer Center Director Graham Allison said Bosworth would bring to the Kennedy School a wealth of experience as a career diplomat, with a long focus on Asia and the Korean peninsula, areas of intense interest for the Belfer Center.
By Sharon Wilke, Associate Director of Communications
The Summer 2013 issue of the Belfer Center newsletter features recent and upcoming activities, research, and analysis by members of the Center community on critical global issues. This edition highlights the Belfer Center’s expanding work on complex cybersecurity issues and Middle East challenges, offers reflections on the role of the U.S. in Iraq, and spotlights work being done by the Center and its affiliates on environment and energy issues.
Newsletter Article, Belfer Center Newsletter
As threats from North Korea intensified this spring, Korean Peninsula experts from the Belfer Center provided insight and analysis.
By Terence Roehrig, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2012–2014
A nuclear North Korea makes it crucial that all countries in Northeast Asia work hard at maintaining a stable security environment that avoids the dangers of a crisis while encouraging North Korea to adopt a nuclear strategy that retains its "no first use" pledge, a strong command and control system, and a stable nuclear weapons posture. Given its relationship with North Korea, China is best positioned to encourage DPRK leaders in these directions.
"Lessons on the Value of a Military Fellowship, North Korea & Iran's Nuclear Pursuits, and the Evolving Cyberspace Domain"
By Troy Endicott, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2012–2013
This paper briefly covers three topics of interest—a description of the author's fellowship and its value, how nuclear weapons are still "game changers" on the 50th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and how the cyberspace domain is reshaping military activities and doctrine in the 21st Century.