PAKISTAN, AQ KHAN
January 2010
Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21st Century
International Security Reader
By Michael E. Brown, Editorial Board Member and Former Co-Editor, Quarterly Journal: International Security, Owen R. Coté, Editor, International Security, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Editor, International Security; Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security and Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
The spread of nuclear weapons is one of the most significant challenges to global security in the twenty-first century. Limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials may be the key to preventing a nuclear war or a catastrophic act of nuclear terrorism. Going Nuclear offers conceptual, historical, and analytical perspectives on current problems in controlling nuclear proliferation. It includes essays that examine why countries seek nuclear weapons as well as studies of the nuclear programs of India, Pakistan, and South Africa.
AP Photo
January 2010
"Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Implications for South Asian Stability"
Policy Brief
By Vipin Narang, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010
"...[E]xtremist elements in Pakistan have a clear incentive to precipitate a crisis between India and Pakistan, so that Pakistan's nuclear assets become more exposed and vulnerable to theft. Terrorist organizations in the region with nuclear ambitions, such as al-Qaida, may find no easier route to obtaining fissile material or a fully functional nuclear weapon than to attack India, thereby triggering a crisis between India and Pakistan and forcing Pakistan to ready and disperse nuclear assets—with few, if any, negative controls—and then attempting to steal the nuclear material when it is being moved or in the field, where it is less secure than in peacetime locations."
Susan Lynch/Belfer Center
Summer 2009
"Q&A with Vipin Narang"
Q&A
By Beth Maclin, Former Communications Assistant, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Vipin Narang, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010
Vipin Narang, a research fellow with International Security Program and Project on Managing the Atom, discusses nuclear security and terrorism.
Belfer Center Photo
Winter 2009-10
"Analyzing the War in Afghanistan: Obama's Fork in the Road"
Newsletter Article, Belfer Center Newsletter
By Sharon Wilke, Associate Director of Communications
As President Barack Obama continues to weigh the impacts of American presence in Afghanistan, the Belfer Center's Graham Allison, Meghan O'Sullivan, and Rory Stewart offer their comments on the situation at this fork in the road.
November 2009
"Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation"
Working Paper
By Matthew Kroenig, Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2007–2008
Matthew Kroenig examines the effect of the spread of nuclear weapons on international politics in a Managing the Atom Working Paper. He observes that the spread of nuclear weapons threatens some states more than others, and proposes a theory of nuclear proliferation that examines the differential effects of proliferation. He argues that the threat nuclear proliferation poses to a particular state depends on that state’s ability to project military power. The spread of nuclear weapons is worse for states that have the ability to project conventional military power over a potential nuclear weapon state because nuclear proliferation constrains their conventional military freedom of action.
2009
"Pride and Prejudice and Prithvis: Strategic Weapons Behavior in South Asia"
Book Chapter
By Vipin Narang, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010
Vipin Narang's chapter "Pride and Prejudice and Prithvis: Strategic Weapons Behavior in South Asia" in the book Inside Nuclear South Asia was published by Stanford University. Narang examines the ballistic missile flight-testing pattern in the region as a proxy for nuclearization and as an indicator for both states' strategic weapons decisions, attempting to clarify the variables that drive both India and Pakistan to test strategic weapons when they do.
November, 2009
Strategies for Acquiring Foreign Nuclear Assistance in the Middle East: Lessons from the United Arab Emirates
Working Paper
By Bryan Early, Former Research Fellow 2008-2009, The Dubai Initiative
The path to acquiring a peaceful civilian nuclear program is fraught with challenges for countries in the Middle East. Given Israel's proactive policies in preventing the proliferation of its neighbors and nuclear supplier states' consternation about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, Arab states face a number of unique obstacles in acquiring foreign nuclear assistance. Yet as the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) recent success in courting the assistance of a number of nuclear supplier states demonstrates, these obstacles are not insurmountable. This piece explores the UAE's strategies in obtaining foreign nuclear assistance to uncover the generalizable insights that may be of use to other Middle Eastern countries seeking to develop peaceful nuclear programs.
AP Photo
October 13, 2009
"U.S., Russia Must Lead on Arms Control"
Op-Ed, Politico
By General Brent Scowcroft, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security, Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor, Nicholas Burns, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics, Harvard Kennedy School and Strobe Talbott
"The Nobel Peace Prize Committee cited Obama's dedication to arms control and nonproliferation when announcing last Friday his selection as this year's laureate. If he creates a positive, mutually reinforcing dynamic in the way he presents and sequences the two treaties [NPT and CTBT], it will give momentum and coherence to follow-on negotiations and the agreements that they produce."
AP Photo
August 13, 2009
"Pakistan's Nukes are Safe. Maybe."
Op-Ed, Foreign Policy
By Vipin Narang, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2010
"...[T]he primary risk to the Pakistani Army's ability to safely secure nuclear assets in its custody would likely be during crisis scenarios — either against India or due to a perceived Western threat to the integrity of Pakistan's arsenal — that might cause Pakistan to move to a higher state of nuclear readiness. If the Army feels compelled to rapidly disperse or relocate nuclear components and loses the defensive advantage of protecting them in secure fixed locations, insider foreknowledge of movements and the loss of centralized control could increase the probability of theft or loss...."
AP Photo
July 2009
"U.S. Aid to Pakistan—U.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption"
Discussion Paper
By Azeem Ibrahim, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2008–2010
The United States must not provide Pakistani institutions with incentives to act counter to U.S. foreign policy objectives in the future. It has done so in the past. But until the spring of 2009, no comprehensive overview of the full funding to Pakistan was possible as the figures were kept secret. Those figures, as well as a full analysis of what is known about how they were spent, can now be evaluated. The available information paints a picture of a systemic lack of supervision in the provision of aid to Pakistan, often lax U.S. oversight, and the incentivization of U.S. taxpayer–funded corruption in the Pakistani military and security services. The author believes that this is the first attempt to present an overview of U.S. aid to Pakistan since 2001, evaluate it, and present recommendations on how to ensure that mistakes are not repeated and lessons are learned.
