INDIA -- NUCLEAR PROGRAM
November 18, 2008
Securing the Bomb 2008
Book
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
Associate Professor of Public Policy and Project on Managing the Atom Co-Principal Investigator Matthew Bunn provides a comprehensive assessment of efforts to secure and remove vulnerable nuclear stockpiles around the world, and a detailed action plan for reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism. Securing the Bomb 2008 was commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). The full report, with additional information on the threat of nuclear terrorism, is available on the NTI website.
September 26, 2007
Securing the Bomb 2007
Book
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
Managing the Atom Senior Research Associate Matthew Bunn provides a comprehensive assessment of efforts to secure and remove vulnerable nuclear stockpiles around the world, and a detailed action plan for reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism. Securing the Bomb 2007 was commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). The full report, with additional information on the threat of nuclear terrorism, is available on the NTI website.
2009
Pride and Prejudice and Prithvis: Strategic Weapons Behavior in South Asia
Book Chapter
By Vipin Narang, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
Vipin Narang's chapter "Pride and Prejudice and Prithvis: Strategic Weapons Behavior in South Asia" in the book Inside Nuclear South Asia was published by Stanford University. Narang examines the ballistic missile flight-testing pattern in the region as a proxy for nuclearization and as an indicator for both states' strategic weapons decisions, attempting to clarify the variables that drive both India and Pakistan to test strategic weapons when they do.
AP Photo
Summer 2009
"Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 34
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Fuhrmann's article "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements," was published by in the Summer 2009 issue of International Security. In his article, Dr. Fuhrmann argues "Peaceful nuclear cooperation—the transfer of nuclear technology, materials, or know-how from one state to another for peaceful purposes—leads to the spread of nuclear weapons. With a renaissance in nuclear power on the horizon, major suppliers, including the United States, should reconsider their willingness to assist other countries in developing peaceful nuclear programs."
April 1, 2009
"Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation"
Journal Article, Journal of Conflict Resolution, issue 2, volume 53
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Fuhrmann's article "Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation," argues that countries provide civil nuclear assistance for three strategic reasons: to strengthen their allies and alliances, to strengthen their relationship with enemies of enemies, and to strengthen existing democracies and bilateral relationships with these countries. The hypotheses are tested using a new data set on more than 2,000 bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreements signed between 1950 and 2000.
Fall 2008
"Nuclear Stability in South Asia"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 2, volume 33
An examination of the onset, evolution, and termination of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises between India and Pakistan suggests that nuclear deterrence is robust in South Asia. Even though the 1999 crisis erupted into a war, its scope and dimensions were carefully circumscribed. Despite its conventional capabilities, India chose not to cross the Line of Control (the de facto international border in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir), and it avoided horizontal escalation of the conflict.
Fall 2008
"Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 2, volume 33
Nuclear weapons have had two destabilizing effects on the South Asian security environment. First, nuclear weapons’ ability to shield Pakistan against all-out Indian retaliation, and to attract international attention to Pakistan’s dispute with India, encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior. Second, these Indo-Pakistani crises led India to adopt a more aggressive conventional military posture toward Pakistan. This development could exacerbate regional security-dilemma dynamics and increase the likelihood of Indo-Pakistani conflict in years to come. Thus nuclear weapons not only destabilized South Asia in the first decade after the nuclear tests; they may damage the regional security environment well into the future.
Summer 2008
"Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 33
By William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova
Although projections of nuclear proliferation abound, they rarely are founded on empirical research or guided by theory. Even fewer studies are informed by a comparative perspective. The two books under review—The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy, by Jacques Hymans, and Nuclear Logics: Alternative Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, by Etel Solingen, are welcome exceptions to this general state of affairs, and represent the cutting edge of nonproliferation research. Both works challenge conventional conceptions of the sources of nuclear weapons decisions and offer new insights into why past predictions of rapid proliferation failed to materialize and why current prognoses about rampant proliferation are similarly flawed. While sharing a number of common features, including a focus on subsystemic determinants of national behavior, the books differ in their methodology, level of analysis, receptivity to multicausal explanations, and assumptions about decisionmaker rationality and the revolutionary nature of the decision. Where one author emphasizes the importance of the individual leader’s national identity conception in determining a state’s nuclear path, the other explains nuclear decisions primarily with regard to the political-economic orientation of the ruling coalition. Notwithstanding a tendency to overinterpret evidence, the books represent the best of contemporary social science research and provide compelling interpretations of nuclear proliferation dynamics of great relevance to scholars and policymakers alike.
AP Photo
Winter 2007/08
"A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 32
India’s inability to coerce Pakistan into halting its support for insurgents in Kashmir, as well as its experience in past conflicts with Pakistan, led it to develop Cold Start—a new offensive military doctrine that will allow it to mobilize quickly and retaliate in a limited manner. Although India is far from realizing its goal, this break from a traditional defensive strategy deserves scrutiny. A history of misperception and mistrust between India and Pakistan, poor intelligence, and domestic insecurity suggests that limited war could quickly escalate to the nuclear threshold, posing a serious risk to the stability of the subcontinent and the rest of the world.
January 10, 2007
How Washington Learned to Stop Worrying and Love India's Bomb
Journal Article, Foreign Affairs
By Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project (on leave), Harvard & Stanford Universities
Carter's update to his July/August 2006 Foreign Affairs essay "America's New Strategic Partner?"
