US AND NUCLEAR ISSUES
November 2009
"Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation"
Working Paper
By Matthew Kroenig, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Kroenig examines the effect of the spread of nuclear weapons on international politics. He proposes a theory of nuclear proliferation that examines the differential effects of nuclear proliferation. Kroenig argues that the threat nuclear proliferation poses to a particular state depends on that state’s ability to project military power. This article contributes to our understanding of the consequences of nuclear proliferation and contains important implications for nuclear nonproliferation policy.
Fall 2009
"Enabling a Nuclear Revival—and Managing Its Risks"
Journal Article, Innovations, issue 4, volume 4
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project and Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Bunn and Martin B. Malin examine the conditions needed for nuclear energy to grow on a scale large enough for it to be a significant part of the world’s response to climate change. They consider the safety, security, nonproliferation, and waste management risks associated with such growth and recommend approaches to managing these risks. Bunn and Malin argue that although technological solutions may contribute to nuclear expansion in the coming decades, in the near term, creating the conditions for large-scale nuclear energy growth will require major international institutional innovation.
AP Photo
November 2009
"Beyond Zero Enrichment: Suggestions for an Iranian Nuclear Deal"
Policy Brief
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
"Some form of negotiated agreement, if it can be achieved, is the “least bad” option for U.S. interests—but is likely to have to include some continuing enrichment in Iran. There are real security risks in agreeing to permit some ongoing enrichment in Iran, but if appropriately managed, these security risks are less than those created by a military strike or allowing Iran to continue unfettered enrichment with no agreement."
November, 2009
Strategies for Acquiring Foreign Nuclear Assistance in the Middle East: Lessons from the United Arab Emirates
Working Paper
By Bryan Early, Research Fellow, The Dubai Initiative
The path to acquiring a peaceful civilian nuclear program is fraught with challenges for countries in the Middle East. Given Israel's proactive policies in preventing the proliferation of its neighbors and nuclear supplier states' consternation about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, Arab states face a number of unique obstacles in acquiring foreign nuclear assistance. Yet as the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) recent success in courting the assistance of a number of nuclear supplier states demonstrates, these obstacles are not insurmountable. This piece explores the UAE's strategies in obtaining foreign nuclear assistance to uncover the generalizable insights that may be of use to other Middle Eastern countries seeking to develop peaceful nuclear programs.
AP Photo
October 13, 2009
"U.S., Russia Must Lead on Arms Control"
Op-Ed, Politico
By General Brent Scowcroft, Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor, R. Nicholas Burns, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics and Strobe Talbott
"The Nobel Peace Prize Committee cited Obama's dedication to arms control and nonproliferation when announcing last Friday his selection as this year's laureate. If he creates a positive, mutually reinforcing dynamic in the way he presents and sequences the two treaties [NPT and CTBT], it will give momentum and coherence to follow-on negotiations and the agreements that they produce."
AP Image
October 9, 2009
"Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Evolving Forms of the Nuclear Genie"
Presentation
By Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Rolf Mowatt-Larssen traces nuclear terrorism in the 21st century beginning with theory and practice, analyzing the implications of 9/11 and weighs in on the reconstruction of the global nuclear order.
AP Photo
October 1, 2009
Obama’s opportunity in Iran
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
By R. Nicholas Burns, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics
The Obama administration faces a daunting set of barriers to diplomatic progress today as the United States holds the first serious talks between Washington and Tehran in 30 years.
September 22, 2009
"Options for Limiting the Security Risks from a Negotiated Nuclear Settlement with Iran"
Presentation
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
Matthew Bunn considers the premises, facts, and risks underlying negotiation with Iran over their nuclear program. He describes a range of options for limiting the risks of a negotiated settlement with Iran. Bunn suggests that insisting on zero centrifuges is likely to lead to no agreement. It is time to begin thinking about what the lowest risk, non-zero options may look like.
AP Image
August 7, 2009
"The Armageddon Test"
Discussion Paper
By Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
How much nuclear material has leaked, and is it in the hands of terrorists, in storage somewhere, or still in circulation? No one knows for sure, but the task of cleaning up the nuclear black market amounts to an Armageddon test for global intelligence. The standard for success is unforgiving: all nuclear material must be recovered before it finds its way into an improvised nuclear device.
Digital Globe/ISIS via AFP
July 23, 2009
"Is North Korea's Reprocessing Facility Operating?"
Magazine or Newspaper Article, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
By Hui Zhang, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
In mid-June, North Korea threatened to weaponize all of its newly separated plutonium. Air samples and satellite imagery, however, don't show evidence that Pyongyang is actively reprocessing its spent nuclear fuel. But this doesn't mean the North isn't reprocessing; there are numerous reasons why its activities wouldn't be detected by commercial satellites and off-site air sampling. The United States and China, must act now to force North Korea to halt plutonium production, stop all weapons tests, and immediately return to the Six-Party Talks.
