US AND NUCLEAR ISSUES
1984
Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 10
By Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project (on leave), Harvard & Stanford Universities
Article by Dr. Ashton B. Carter in International Security
1984
Ballistic Missile Defense
Book
By Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project (on leave), Harvard & Stanford Universities and David N. Schwartz
Book edited by Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz
April 1984
Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space
Report
By Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project (on leave), Harvard & Stanford Universities
Report by Dr. Ashton B. Carter for The Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress
September 1981
MX Missile Basing
Book
The purpose of this study is to identify MX basing modes and to assess the major advantages, disadvantages, risks, and uncertainties of each.
September 1981
Air Mobile MX Basing
Book Chapter
By Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project (on leave), Harvard & Stanford Universities
This chapter discusses three concepts, distinguished by their approaches to the problems of dependence on warning for survivability and postattack endurance beyond the unrefueled flight time of the aircraft.
1973
Military Capabilities and American Foreign Policy
Journal Article, The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science, issue 1, volume 406
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School
Can the availability of a rapid response capability lead the United States to intervene militarily in situations where, without those ready forces, the U.S. government would decide that military intervention was not required? Secretary of Defense McNamara said no; Senator Richard Russell said yes. After examining the basic approaches to weapons selection that led McNamara and Russell to opposite conclusions, this article reviews recent instances—Dienbien— phu, Laos, Korea, the Bay of Pigs, and Vietnam—in which the presence or absence of a ready military option may have affected decisions about the use of force. A conclusion about who had the better part of the argument provides a base for drawing some implications concerning the full costs and benefits of military capabilities and the responsibilities of the secretary of defense.
The New Hegemon
Magazine or Newspaper Article, The New Republic, issue 4,796
By Vali Nasr, Senior Fellow, Dubai Initiative
As the war in Iraq has depleted U.S. power and prestige in the Middle East, Iran has seized the opportunity to wield greater influence, and its nuclear gambit has only increased its confidence. Yet Washington continues to misread Iran as just another rogue state. Three new states offer an analysis of Iran as it truly is.
Beyond the Cold War: Conceptual Challenges for US foreign Policy in the 1990s
Journal Article, American Review, volume vol. 10
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School
A look at the challenges of U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s and how it has been influenced by the Cold War and how foreign policy strategies have changed since.
Before The Morning After
Journal Article, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School
In April of 1995, home-grown American terrorists parked a rented Ryder truck packed with fertilizer-based explosives outside the Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City.1 As noted at trial, their objective was to deliver the weapons during a period in which they might get a high body-count.2 They succeeded in killing 168 American men, women and children.3 Two years earlier, Sheik Rahman, an Egyptian Islamic cleric, and his collaborators rented a minivan, packed it with fertilizer-based explosives and parked it in the basement of the World Trade Center.4 They anticipated that the resulting blast would cause one World Trade Center tower to fall on the other.5 The trial revealed that their ultimate targets were not just the World Trade Center, but also the United Nations building, the Federal Office Building in lower Manhattan, the George Washington Bridge and the Lincoln and Holland [*pg 8] tunnels.6 They hoped to kill a large number of Americans. If they had parked their minivan in the right place, they could have killed forty thousand people.
