US AND NUCLEAR ISSUES
January 29, 1996
Nuclear and Present Danger
Op-Ed, The Scotsman
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
ON 18 APRIL 1995, American terrorists demolished Oklahoma City's federal office building, killing 162 people. Two and a half years earlier, international terrorists attacked New York City's 110-storey World Trade Center. Had that explosion succeeded in undermining the structural foundation, 30,000 people would have died.From Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center to the first act of nuclear terrorism is but one small step. Suppose that instead of mini-vans filled with hundreds of pounds of the crude explosives used in Oklahoma City and New York, terrorists had acquired a suitcase carrying a, grapefruit sized 100 pounds of highly-enriched uranium (HEV).
April 30, 1995
Must We Wait for the Nuclear Morning After?
Op-Ed, Washington Post
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
What is the message of the Oklahoma City bombing for American national security? First, the oft-repeated assertion that with the end of the Cold War, the United States faces no direct or immediate threat to our security at home is dead wrong. As the most open society on a shrinking globe, America's democracy is also most vulnerable to terrorists' attacks. Such actions threaten not only our security but also our freedom.
1994
Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century
Book Chapter
By Ashton B. Carter, Former Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities and Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
Chapter in Janne E. Nolan's book "Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century"
1993
The Role of Intelligence
Book Chapter
By Robert D. Blackwill, International Council Member, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Ashton B. Carter, Former Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities
Chapter 9 in New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy
1993
Export Control Reform in High Technology
Testimony
By Ashton B. Carter, Former Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities
Testimony by Dr. Ashton B. Carter
January 1993
Cooperative Denuclearization: From Pledges to Deeds
Book
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School, Ashton B. Carter, Former Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities, Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Philip D. Zelikow, Former Associate Professor of Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School; Former Faculty Affiliate, International Security Program
"CSIA's research on cooperative denuclearization began during the August 1991 putsch against Mikhail Gorbachev. To those of us familiar with nuclear weapons, their construction, and command and control, and with the looming revolution about to sweep the then–Soviet Union, it was plain that a new and unprecedented danger to international security was emerging. An appropriate policy response to this new form of nuclear threat could not be fashioned from traditional Cold War tools of deterrence, arms control, and military preparedness alone. Safety could only be sought through new policies emphasizing cooperative engagement with the new states, new leaders, and military and industrial heirs of the former Soviet Union...."
March 29, 1992
The Soviet Arsenal and the Mistaken Calculus of Caution
Journal Article, Washington Post
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School and Ashton B. Carter, Former Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities
Op-ed by Dr. Ashton B. Carter and Dr. Graham T. Allison in The Washington Post
February 9, 1992
Review of Dino Brugioni's Eyeball to Eyeball
Op-Ed, New York Times Book Review
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
Distant as it is, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 still offeres the best lens available through which to examine the possibilities of nuclear confrontation, problems of crisis management and opportunities for crisis prevention. It remains the only occasion in the postwar era when the United States and the Soviet Union stood "eyeball to eyeball" contemplating actions that could have led directly to nuclear war. Dino A. Brugioni has now made an important contribution to the growing number of books on the crisis. His is the first account of this event as seen through the eyes of the intelligence officer. He has made admirable use of his own personal experience (he was the supervisor of aerial reconnaissance photographs during the crisis), as well as the historian's craft (he is also the author of a book on the Civil War), to retell this story with special intention to the role played by intelligence.
January / February 1992
Reducing the Nuclear Dangers from the Former Soviet Union
Journal Article, Arms Control Today, issue 1, volume 22
By Ashton B. Carter, Former Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities
Dr. Ashton B. Carter's article in Arms Control Today.
January 3, 1992
Nuclear Objectives
Op-Ed, Financial Times (London)
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
Can the west seize the present moment of opportunity to secure and disable nuclear weapons on the territories of those former Soviet republics that wish to be nuclear free? The answer is yes - but only with a strategy that marshalls all western instruments of influence and exercises them with a sense for priorities.
