US AND NUCLEAR ISSUES
Magazine or Newspaper Article, The National Interest
In the United States and Europe, many believe that the best way to prevent Russia’s resumption of its historic imperial mission is to assure the independence of Ukraine. They insist that the West must do whatever is required to stop the Kremlin from establishing direct or indirect control over that country. Otherwise, they foresee Russia reassembling the former Soviet empire and threatening all of Europe. Conversely, in Russia, many claim that while Russia is willing to recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (with the exception of Crimea), Moscow will demand no less than any other great power would on its border. Security on its western frontier requires a special relationship with Ukraine and a degree of deference expected in major powers’ spheres of influence. More specifically, Russia’s establishment sentiment holds that the country can never be secure if Ukraine joins NATO or becomes a part of a hostile Euro-Atlantic community. From their perspective, this makes Ukraine’s nonadversarial status a nonnegotiable demand for any Russia powerful enough to defend its national-security interests.
April 8, 2015
Op-Ed, Just Security
By Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Based on an initial reading, I believe the framework for a nuclear agreement with Iran is worth trying to develop into a concrete deal, as long as the US-led coalition stays tough on terms, and recognizes that there are no verification measures that can guarantee that Iran won’t cheat. These negotiations are not about creating a legally binding document that replaces Iran’s existing obligations under the Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT), which remain binding. Thus, the details of compliance and measures of verification are notable, but they won’t prove to be decisive in ultimately assessing the merits of the agreement.
April 2, 2015
By Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
On April 2, 2015, Matthew Bunn presented "The Iranian Nuclear Deal: Benefits and Risks" at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This presentation assess the benefits and risks of the Iranian deal compared to plausible alternatives.
March 24, 2015
By William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons is vital to U.S. national security interests. A key aspect of that matter is Iran’s compliance with its Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and with other related agreements. It is a broad subject, but I understand the Committee has specific interests, so I will confine my statement to those topics.
March 23, 2015
By Laura Rockwood, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
In 1996, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States and the Russian Federation entered into a cooperative effort – the Trilateral Initiative – aimed at investigating the feasibility and requirements for a verification system under which the IAEA could accept and monitor nuclear warheads or nuclear warhead components pursuant to the NPT Article VI commitments of both States. Although the Initiative ended in 2002, the Model Verification Agreement produced could still serve as the basis for bilateral or multilateral agreements between the IAEA and nuclear-weapon States.
In this paper, Thomas E. Shea and Laura Rockwood examine the potential role for international verification of fissile material in relation to nuclear disarmament, what was accomplished under the Trilateral Initiative and, more importantly, what should be done now to preserve its legacy and take concrete steps towards such verification.
Newsletter Article, Belfer Center Newsletter
Our faculty and fellows are immersed in studying and solving some of the world's toughtest policy challenges. Amid that sobering work, they sometimes spot positive developments. We asked them to share these findings in this new feature.
Newsletter Article, Belfer Center Newsletter
Matthew Bunn is a professor of practice at Harvard Kennedy School and co-principal investigator for the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom. Bunn’s research focus is on nuclear theft terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and innovation in energy technology. During the Clinton administration, Bunn served as an advisor to the White House Office of Science Technology Policy, where he played a major role in U.S. policies related to the control and disposition of weapons-usable nuclear materials in the United States and the former Soviet Union. We asked Bunn about the current crisis in U.S.-Russian relations and its impact on nuclear security.
March 13, 2015
Op-Ed, Foreign Policy
By Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs; Faculty Chair, International Security Program
"...[O]ver time I’ve changed my mind about a fair number of academic, historical, and contemporary issues. I used to believe a number of things that turned out not to be correct, and there are others where at a minimum I know have considerable doubts. And guess what? Changing my mind isn't all that painful a process; in fact, it can be both liberating and enjoyable to realize that earlier beliefs were mistaken."
March 6, 2015
Op-Ed, Foreign Policy
By Jayita Sarkar, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"Even as Prime Minister Narendra Modi is forging closer ties with Washington, he is not budging from New Delhi's core positions on a climate change agreement or the Nuclear Liability Bill. Even when as an insurance pool of $250 million is being offered to nuclear suppliers, there seems to be very little possibility of scrapping the Liability Bill entirely for U.S. suppliers."
February 18, 2015
Op-Ed, The Boston Globe
By Nicholas Burns, Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations, Harvard Kennedy School
In this article, Professor Burns illustrates all that Russian President Vladimir Putin has done to destabilize Eastern Ukraine during the past twelve months. He also makes the point that President Obama and Chancellor Merkel must now push back in three ways if the current cease-fire continues to unravel: 1) to agree on significantly stronger economic sanctions; 2) to provide much more substantial economic assistance to the Ukrainian government; and 3) to deliver lethal military assistance to the Ukrainian government.