INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE
Credit: CNAS Website
June 2008
Military Elements in a Strategy to Deal with Iran's Nuclear Program
Paper
By Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities
PDP Co-Director Ashton B. Carter explores military elements in the U.S. strategy for addressing Iran's nuclear program.
http://www.sup.org/book.cgi?book_id=5976 5977
June 2008
The Yellow Rain Affair
Book Chapter
By Matthew Meselson, Director, Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and Biological Weapons Limitation and Julian Perry Robinson
U.S.Secretary of State Alexander Haig, in a speech in West Berlin in September 1981 and in a detailed report to the Congress the following March, charged Soviet-backed Laotian and Vietnamese forces with waging toxin warfare against Hmong resistance fighters and their villages in Laos and against Khmer Rouge soldiers and villages in Cambodia. The charges were repeated with additional details in a further report to the Congress and to the member states of the United Nations in November 1982 by Haig's successor, Secretary of State George Shultz. The investigation on which the allegation was based, however, failed to employ reliable methods of witness interrogation or of forensic laboratory investigation; it was further marred by the dismissal and withholding of contrary evidence and a lack of independent review. When the evidence for toxin attacks or any other form of chemical/biological warfare (CBW) was subjected to more careful examination, it could not be confirmed or was discredited. In what became known as the "Yellow Rain" affair, these charges -- that toxic substances called trichothecenes were used in CBW -- were initially pressed vigorously by the U.S. government and, even when the allegations proved unsustainable, they were not withdrawn.
May 12, 2008
"Future of Japan-US Alliance"
Op-Ed, The Korea Times
By Joseph S. Nye, Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations
"The U.S. regards a triangular Japan-China-U.S. relationship as the basis of stability in East Asia, and wants good relations between all three of its legs. But the triangle is not equilateral, because the U.S. is allied with Japan, and China need not become a threat to either country if they maintain that alliance....a wise policy combines realism with liberalism. By reinforcing their alliance, the U.S. and Japan can hedge against uncertainty while at the same time offering China integration into global institutions as a "responsible stakeholder."
May 6, 2008
"U.S. Worry Grows over Pakistan's Tribal Peace Deal"
Media Feature
By Xenia Dormandy, Director of the Belfer Center's Project on India and the Subcontinent
Jackie Northam of NPR interviews Xenia Dormandy, Director of the Project on India and the Subcontinent, regarding the new Pakistani government's negotiations with militants tied to al Qaeda.
AP Photo
May 5, 2008
Preventing Terrorist Attacks: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom
Policy Memo
By Erik J. Dahl, Research Fellow, International Security Program
Why do terrorist attacks frequently succeed, even though later investigations almost always show that warnings had been available but were either misunderstood or ignored? Conventional wisdom, as seen in the 9/11 Commission Report, holds that disasters such as the 9/11 attacks have been caused by failures of analytical imagination, a lack of long-term strategic intelligence on the threat, and organizational limitations that prevent the U.S. intelligence community from being able to “connect the dots” of the existing intelligence.
Spring 2008
"Correspondence: The Role of Hierarchy in International Politics"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 32
By Paul MacDonald, Research Fellow, International Security Program and David A. Lake
Paul MacDonald responds to David Lake's Summer 2007 International Security article, "Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics."
Spring 2008
"What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 32
By Max Abrahms
The strategic model—the dominant paradigm in terrorism studies—claims that terrorists are rational actors who attack civilians to achieve political goals. To defeat terrorism, policymakers have sought to decrease its political utility by adhering to a no concessions policy, engaging in political accommodation, and promoting democracy. The evidence suggests, however, that terrorists are not motivated primarily by a desire to achieve political objectives. Rather, they use terrorism to develop strong affective ties with fellow terrorists. Counterterrorism strategies must therefore find ways to diminish the social utility of terrorism.
Spring 2008
"No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 32
By Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason
The portion of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area dominated by Pashtun tribes poses the greatest challenge to U.S. national security interests. Here, extremist groups such as the Taliban and al-Qaida continue to enjoy safe haven. The Pashtun, whose tribal structures have been subverted since the 1970s, represent a unique cultural challenge that the U.S. foreign policy establishment has failed to appreciate. To reverse the trend of radicalization in this area, the United States and the Afghan government must strengthen and rebuild the Pashtuns’ tribal structures while reducing the external pressures on them. Maintaining the current policy of extending the central government into this region will only foment insurgency among a proto-insurgent people.
AP Photo
Spring 2008
"The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 32
In 2001 U.S. and Afghan forces overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Less than a year later, insurgents began a sustained effort to bring down the government of Hamid Karzai. Fueling this insurgency was the collapse of governance following the ouster of the Taliban. To counter the insurgents, the government must extend governance into Afghanistan’s rural areas and establish effective law and order. Also needed is greater cooperation by the Pakistani government to capture or kill jihadists and undermine their ideological support.
AP Photo
2008
"The Shia Factor"
Journal Article, Heartland: Eurasian Review of Geopolitics, (The Pakistani Boomerang Issue), issue 1
By Kayhan Barzegar, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
The new rivalry between two main Muslim communities is the result of the political developments in Iraq. The pragmatic relationship between Iran and the Shia factions in other countries. The fears of Sunni regimes of a Shia crescent moon.
