INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE
June 30, 2015
Magazine or Newspaper Article, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
By Ariane Tabatabai, Former Associate, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2014–2015; Former Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2013–2014
A discussion of the state of play in the apparent final days of the Iranian nuclear negotiations and the stumbling blocks remaining on the path toward a final deal
"Do Nuclear Weapons Affect the Guns-butter Trade-off? Evidence on Nuclear Substitution from Pakistan and Beyond"
Journal Article, Conflict, Security & Development, issue 3, volume 15
By Ahsan I. Butt, Former Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2014–2015; Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, August 1, 2011–August 31, 2012
Scholars have argued that acquiring nuclear weapons should allow states the luxury of exiting conventional arms races. In turn, a decreased budgetary focus on conventional arms should make possible greater spending on social welfare. The author contests this logic of nuclear substitution by examining its most likely exponent, Pakistan. As a poor, underdeveloped state, a nuclear Pakistan should have welcomed the opportunity to cease its arms race with India, and spend greater sums on its population's welfare. Instead, the article shows that Pakistan has doubled down on its pre-nuclear conventional posture, mainly because of its revisionism over Kashmir.
By William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
A good nuclear agreement with Iran requires that we know first, what work has Iran conducted toward nuclear weapons, and second, can we guarantee that Iran has stopped and will not resume this work. If these questions are not answered correctly and completely before the negotiations conclude, the resulting agreement will be illusory.
June 29, 2015
Op-Ed, India in Transition
By Jayita Sarkar, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"The middle powers' congruence between New Delhi and Paris expanded with French quest for nuclear technology partners outside Europe, especially for technology that had not already been proved to be economically viable. For much of the Cold War, French nonchalance toward nuclear safeguards, frequent foreign policy differences with Washington, and close ties between key Indian and French physicists helped further. From India's point of view, the CEA offered technological assistance, including active encouragement as in 1974, when no other atomic energy commission was willing to offer much."
June 28, 2015
Magazine or Newspaper Article, The New York Times
Iran’s top nuclear negotiator was heading back to Tehran on Sunday to consult with his nation’s leadership, as negotiators remained divided over how to limit and monitor Tehran’s nuclear program and even on how to interpret the preliminary agreement they reached two months ago.
June 24, 2015
By Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Unfettered access to sites, facilities, material, equipment, people, and documents is imperative to the credible long-term verification of any nuclear agreement with Iran. This “anywhere, anytime” access and short notice inspections must not be subject to a dispute resolution mechanism, which would delay the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) access.
June 24, 2015
Op-Ed, Washington Post
The announcement this month that 450 additional U.S. trainers and support troops will deploy to Iraq represents a modest step forward in the fight against the Islamic State. But the move by itself will not turn the tide in a faltering effort. To succeed in the president’s ambition of ultimately destroying the Islamic State — or even to contain its gains or roll them back — a broader and more intensive effort is needed.
June 24, 2015
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
Belfer Center Director Graham Allison testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on "Lessons Learned from Past WMD Negotiations" to inform assessment of a comprehensive nuclear deal that will prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
By Gary Samore, Executive Director for Research, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
To assist Members of Congress and observers in analyzing these issues and judging a potential comprehensive agreement, the Belfer Center prepared this brief to outline the key facets of sanctions against Iran. Written as an addendum to our April policy brief, ‘Decoding the Iran Nuclear Deal,’ this report is driven by the policy debate’s leading questions.
June 24, 2015
Op-Ed, The New York Times
By David E. Sanger, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Adjunct Lecturer in Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School
Five former members of President Obama’s inner circle of Iran advisers have written an open letter expressing concern that a pending accord to stem Iran’s nuclear program “may fall short of meeting the administration’s own standard of a ‘good’ agreement” and laying out a series of minimum requirements that Iran must agree to in coming days for them to support a final deal.