NUCLEAR ISSUES
November 2009
"Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation"
Working Paper
By Matthew Kroenig, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Kroenig examines the effect of the spread of nuclear weapons on international politics. He proposes a theory of nuclear proliferation that examines the differential effects of nuclear proliferation. Kroenig argues that the threat nuclear proliferation poses to a particular state depends on that state’s ability to project military power. This article contributes to our understanding of the consequences of nuclear proliferation and contains important implications for nuclear nonproliferation policy.
AP Photo
November 2009
"Beyond Zero Enrichment: Suggestions for an Iranian Nuclear Deal"
Policy Brief
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
"Some form of negotiated agreement, if it can be achieved, is the “least bad” option for U.S. interests—but is likely to have to include some continuing enrichment in Iran. There are real security risks in agreeing to permit some ongoing enrichment in Iran, but if appropriately managed, these security risks are less than those created by a military strike or allowing Iran to continue unfettered enrichment with no agreement."
2009
Pride and Prejudice and Prithvis: Strategic Weapons Behavior in South Asia
Book Chapter
By Vipin Narang, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
Vipin Narang's chapter "Pride and Prejudice and Prithvis: Strategic Weapons Behavior in South Asia" in the book Inside Nuclear South Asia was published by Stanford University. Narang examines the ballistic missile flight-testing pattern in the region as a proxy for nuclearization and as an indicator for both states' strategic weapons decisions, attempting to clarify the variables that drive both India and Pakistan to test strategic weapons when they do.
AP Photo
November 1, 2009
"A Middle Way, Best Solution to Nuclear Crisis"
Op-Ed, Iran Review
By Kayhan Barzegar, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
"Although it is difficult under the current circumstances to predict Iran's response to the agreement, but all signs point to a middle way, which if chosen carefully, could be positive and in line with Iran's national interests. In fact, if Iran kept part of the enriched uranium in the country and sent the rest to another country, it would pave the way for the continuation of cooperation."
October 30, 2009
Iran: Reform of Energy Subsidies
Journal Article, Monthly Review
By Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, Research Fellow, The Dubai Initiative
At long last and after decades of talking about doing something about the subsidies, there is a bill before Iran's majlis to target (but not remove) subsidies. I could not locate the bill itself but my impression is that it only addresses energy subsidies and not other subsidies such as food and medicine. So far only 5 of the bill's 14 articles have been passed, but the government already has the mandate to raise prices on energy products over the next five years
October 22, 2009
"Russian Nuke Plans, Overkill"
Op-Ed, International Relations and Security Network
By Simon Saradzhyan, Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
The Russian military and security community's drive to expand the use of nuclear weapons in the new defense doctrine will add little value to deterring real threats, but may undermine Russia's image as a co-leader of nuclear arms control, Simon Saradzhyan comments for ISN Security Watch.
AP Photo
October 13, 2009
"U.S., Russia Must Lead on Arms Control"
Op-Ed, Politico
By General Brent Scowcroft, Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor, R. Nicholas Burns, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics and Strobe Talbott
"The Nobel Peace Prize Committee cited Obama's dedication to arms control and nonproliferation when announcing last Friday his selection as this year's laureate. If he creates a positive, mutually reinforcing dynamic in the way he presents and sequences the two treaties [NPT and CTBT], it will give momentum and coherence to follow-on negotiations and the agreements that they produce."
AP Photo
October 13, 2009
"Obama's Nuclear Agenda"
Op-Ed, Daily News Egypt
By Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
"So long as the world remains a dangerous place with several nuclear weapons states, Obama must reassure its allies about the credibility of American guarantees of extended deterrence. Otherwise, reductions that create anxieties in other countries could lead them to develop their own weapons and thus increase the number of nuclear weapons states."
AP Image
October 9, 2009
"Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Evolving Forms of the Nuclear Genie"
Presentation
By Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Rolf Mowatt-Larssen traces nuclear terrorism in the 21st century beginning with theory and practice, analyzing the implications of 9/11 and weighs in on the reconstruction of the global nuclear order.
AP Photo
October 2009
"Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace"
Discussion Paper
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom and Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007-2008
When do states attack or consider attacking nuclear infrastructure in nonnuclear weapons states? Despite the importance of this question, relatively few scholarly articles have attempted to identify the factors that lead a state to attack another state's nuclear facilities. This paper conducts the first large-n analysis on when states use force as a way to control proliferation.
This paper challenges existing arguments that states are deterred from attacking nuclear programs by the prospect of a military retaliation from the proliferating state or concerns about international condemnation. Instead, it finds that states are more likely to attack nuclear programs when they believe that the proliferating state might use nuclear weapons or engage in other offensive behavior. States are willing to accept substantial costs in attacking if they believe that a particular country's acquisition of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat to their security.
