March 13, 2013
Op-Ed, Washington Post
By David Ignatius, Senior Fellow, Future of Diplomacy Project
"The Obama administration’s approach toward North Korea has been described as 'strategic patience.' A more accurate evaluation of U.S. policy would be “failure.” The administration has alternately wooed and threatened North Korea for four years, with no discernible effect.
Here’s what failure looks like: Since President Obama took office, Pyongyang has conducted several missile tests and two nuclear weapons tests, the most recent on Feb. 12. When the international community has tried to hold Pyongyang accountable, the regime has become even more erratic," warns David Ignatius of the Washington Post.
March 18, 2013
By William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
The most recent North Korean nuclear detonation is as much a test of China’s foreign policy as it was of the DPRK’s ability to induce atomic fission. It exposes outdated assumptions and policies, and the pernicious effects of China’s mushrooming foreign trade and investment in North Korea. Beijing’s relations with Pyongyang are guided by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which still thinks of the 1950 conflict as “the war to resist America and aid Korea.” The policy that China and North Korea should be as close as “lips and teeth” is a relic of the Cold War. The notion that North Korea could or should somehow act as a “buffer state” in an era of air power and massive Chinese trade with the South is equally archaic. Click the link below for the full text of this article:
March 15, 2013
Op-Ed, Policy Watch
Talks with Iran in Turkey next week and in Kazakhstan next month are important, but Tehran still needs to clarify the details of its controversial nuclear program.
March 15, 2013
Russia in Review: a digest of useful news from U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism for March 8-15, 2013.
March 13, 2013
By Trevor Findlay, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
This seminar considered how the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reacted to nuclear crises. The IAEA often appears not just to have weathered such crises, but to have successfully leaped through windows of opportunity presented by them. This has resulted in periodic expansions of its mandate, capabilities, and resources. The 2011 Fukushima disaster appears to be a puzzling exception, raising the question of what concatenation of factors needs to be present for the IAEA to take advantage of nuclear crises.
March 11, 2013
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
By Juliette Kayyem, Lecturer in Public Policy
"March 11, 2011, was three distinct disasters. The earthquake and tsunami fell into the category of tragedies that are often unavoidable. But the nuclear accident requires a different analytical frame, and proponents of nuclear energy shouldn't be allowed to write off the Fukushima crisis as a natural disaster. Since the industrial revolution, there have always been industrial harms. As societies require more of technology, engineering, and transportation, there will be blips in the systems. What isn't inevitable, however, is that they happen again."
March 8, 2013
Russia in Review: a digest of useful news from U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism for March 1-8, 2013.
March 6, 2013
By Tytti Erästö, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"The problem is that, from an Iranian perspective, recent offers fail to suggest that the zero enrichment demand would not be reasserted; sanctions continue to be based on it and the P5+1 continue to refuse to recognize Iran's right to enrichment. The resulting vagueness about end goals is reinforced by the absence of any apparent intention to lift the tightening Western sanctions as part of a potential nuclear deal."
March 6, 2013
Op-Ed, Los Angeles Times
By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
"From China's perspective, the crisis is driven by Washington and Pyongyang. North Korea is unlikely to give up its nuclear ambitions until it gets from the U.S. what it covets most: a reliable security assurance. This would mean an end to Washington's pursuit of regime change. If Washington does not move in this direction, Pyongyang will continue to escalate the crisis. Any resolution of the impasse has to address the reasonable security concerns of North Korea."
March 1, 2013
Russia in Review: a digest of useful news from U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism for February 22 - March 1, 2013.