August 15, 2013
In October, 2012, at the foot of a rocky hillside in eastern Kazakhstan, a group of American, Russian, and Kazakh nuclear scientists and engineers gathered for a ceremony marking the completion of a secret 17-year, $150 million operation to secure plutonium in the tunnels of Degelen Mountain—an abandoned site of Soviet underground nuclear testing. "Plutonium Mountain: Inside the 17-Year Mission to Secure a Dangerous Legacy of Soviet Nuclear Testing," a report released today by The Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, provides details on one of the largest nuclear security operations of the post-Cold War years.
August 15, 2013
The Belfer Center’s Eben Harrell and Pulitzer Prize-winning author David E. Hoffman for the first time report the details of one of the largest nuclear security operations of the post-Cold War years — a secret 17-year, $150 million operation to secure plutonium in the tunnels of Degelen Mountain.
August 15, 2013
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
By Nicholas Burns, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics, Harvard Kennedy School
With a speed few predicted, Iran’s new president, Hassan Rouhani, has signaled his interest in negotiations this autumn on Iran’s controversial nuclear program," writes Nicholas Burns. "This could produce the first extensive contact between Washington and Tehran since diplomatic relations ruptured during the Jimmy Carter administration."
August 7, 2013
Op-Ed, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
By Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
Ayman Khalil asked whether the effort to create a WMD-free zone in the Middle East is dead. Martin's answer is this: The effort will continue, but the opportunity presented by the 2010 Review Conference for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) may be slipping out of reach.
Journal Article, issue 1, volume 38
By Paul R. Pillar, Robert Reardon, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, James K. Sebenius, Gordon Donaldson Professor of Business Administration, HBS, Belfer Center Faculty Affiliate and Michael K. Singh
Paul R. Pillar and Robert Reardon respond to James K. Sebenius and Michael K. Singh's Winter 2012/2013 International Security article, "Is a Nuclear Deal with Iran Possible: An Analytical Framework for the Iran Nuclear Negotiations."
August 1, 2013
Op-Ed, RIA Novosti
By Simon Saradzhyan, Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
"So Snowden has left the building. The NSA leaker’s departure from Moscow’s Sheremetyevo airport, for an undisclosed location in Russia, on Thursday is turning into a real blessing for the US-Russian relationship," writes Simon Saradzhyan. "It may sound perverse, but both Barack Obama, and, to a lesser extent, Vladimir Putin, have good cause to thank the man whom the US government has fruitlessly asked Russia to extradite and whom the Russian government has just granted temporary asylum."
August 1, 2013
Magazine or Newspaper Article, The Atlantic
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
"There can be no question whatsoever that in 2013 Iran could get a bomb; there is also no question that Iran could be bombed,” writes Graham Allison. “But my best judgement is that in 2013 Iran will not get a bomb, and Iran will not be bombed. To be precise, I am prepared to bet $51 of my money against $49 of those who want to bet that by December 31, 2013, Iran will either have a nuclear weapon or have been the target of a major bombing attack."
July 17, 2013
By Gary Samore, Executive Director for Research, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Gary Samore, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs's Executive Director for Research, spoke on a panel entitled "Iran: Crossing the Red Line?" at the Aspen Security Forum in July of 2013.
The videotaped discussion is available here.
July 14, 2013
By David Nusbaum, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
A long-standing goal of diplomacy with Iran is persuading Iran to suspend its enrichment operations while it clarifies its past activities and while negotiations proceed on a more permanent resolution to the nuclear crisis. However, there is problem in using suspension of nuclear material production as a negotiating step: The technical details of suspension have never been clearly defined. The international community needs to be aware of the diversion risks during a suspension of enrichment activities and should mitigate these risks by including the necessary verification measures during negotiations and signing of any agreement on suspension.
July 9, 2013
HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal’s new plan boldly picks up the challenge. He has recognized that, in his words, “there is no more pressing international threat to peace and security than the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their possible use.” A veteran of international diplomacy, he understands that the path leading towards the summit of a world without nuclear weapons will be a long and hazardous climb. But he believes that real victories can be gained, and the security ofthe world enhanced, by aiming for achievable intermediate goals along the way.