NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
1997
Before The Morning After
Journal Article, Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, issue no. 1, volume vol. 8
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
Symposium: Contempory Issues in Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction
If the Cold War is over and our nuclear nemesis has "retargeted" its nuclear weapons, why does a nuclear threat still hang over us? The answer is that the demise of the Soviet Union left behind an arsenal of thirty thousand nuclear warheads and seventy thousand nuclear weapons-equivalents 3/4 lumps of highly-enriched uranium and plutonium. These items are now located in a society convulsed by a revolution whose central control systems cannot even collect taxes. Russian society has become increasingly free, increasingly chaotic, and increasingly criminalized.December, 1996
Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East
Book
By Shai Feldman, Member of the Board, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
The political dimensions of the Arab-Israeli relationship have changed dramatically in recent years. Israel and its Arab neighbors have made remarkable progress toward resolving long-standing conflicts. In Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East, Shai Feldman considers whether these political breakthroughs have set the stage for agreements on controlling nuclear weapons in the region. He presents a richly detailed overview of the current situation and lays out an agenda for future efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war in the Middle East.
March, 1996
Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material
Book
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School, Owen R. Coté, Editor, International Security, Richard A. Falkenrath, Former Assistant Professor of Public Policy; Former Principal Investigator, Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness; Former Executive Director for Research, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
What if the bomb that exploded in Oklahoma City or New York's World Trade Center had used 100 pounds of highly enriched uranium? The destruction would have been far more vast. This danger is not so remote: the recipe for making such a bomb is simple, and soon the ingredients might be easily attained. Thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of tons of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium from the weapons complex of the former Soviet Union, poorly guarded and poorly accounted for, could soon leak on to a vast emerging nuclear black market.
January 29, 1996
Nuclear and Present Danger
Op-Ed, The Scotsman
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
ON 18 APRIL 1995, American terrorists demolished Oklahoma City's federal office building, killing 162 people. Two and a half years earlier, international terrorists attacked New York City's 110-storey World Trade Center. Had that explosion succeeded in undermining the structural foundation, 30,000 people would have died. From Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center to the first act of nuclear terrorism is but one small step. Suppose that instead of mini-vans filled with hundreds of pounds of the crude explosives used in Oklahoma City and New York, terrorists had acquired a suitcase carrying a, grapefruit sized 100 pounds of highly-enriched uranium (HEV). Assuming a simple, well-known design, a weapon fashioned from this material would produce a nuclear blast equivalent to 10,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT. Under normal conditions, this would devastate a three-square mile urban area. Oklahoma City would have disappeared. The tip of Manhattan, including all of Wall Street reaching up to Gramercy Park, would have been destroyed. AS A DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF the collapse of the Soviet Union, a buyer's market for the raw materials needed to build simple nuclear bombs has emerged. This has transformed the nature of the world's nuclear proliferation problem in a manner that is only slowly being appreciated by international leaders.
1994
Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century
Book Chapter
By Ashton B. Carter, Former Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities and Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
Chapter in Janne E. Nolan's book "Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century"
1993
The Role of Intelligence
Book Chapter
By Ashton B. Carter, Former Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities and Robert D. Blackwill, International Council Member, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Chapter 9 in New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy
1993
Export Control Reform in High Technology
Testimony
By Ashton B. Carter, Former Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities
Testimony by Dr. Ashton B. Carter
January 1993
Cooperative Denuclearization: From Pledges to Deeds
Book
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School, Ashton B. Carter, Former Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities, Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Philip D. Zelikow, Former Associate Professor of Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School; Former Faculty Affiliate, International Security Program
"CSIA's research on cooperative denuclearization began during the August 1991 putsch against Mikhail Gorbachev. To those of us familiar with nuclear weapons, their construction, and command and control, and with the looming revolution about to sweep the then–Soviet Union, it was plain that a new and unprecedented danger to international security was emerging. An appropriate policy response to this new form of nuclear threat could not be fashioned from traditional Cold War tools of deterrence, arms control, and military preparedness alone. Safety could only be sought through new policies emphasizing cooperative engagement with the new states, new leaders, and military and industrial heirs of the former Soviet Union...."
March 29, 1992
The Soviet Arsenal and the Mistaken Calculus of Caution
Journal Article, Washington Post
By Ashton B. Carter, Former Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities and Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
Op-ed by Dr. Ashton B. Carter and Dr. Graham T. Allison in The Washington Post
1992
Implications of the Dissolution of the Soviet Union for Accidental/Inadvertent Uses of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Book
By Steven E. Miller, Director, International Security Program; Editor-in-Chief, International Security; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom, Owen R. Coté, Editor, International Security and Ashton B. Carter, Former Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities
Book by Steven E. Miller, Ashton B. Carter, and Owen Cote
