NATO
August 25, 2011
"The Return of the West"
Op-Ed, The Huffington Post
By Charles G. Cogan, Associate, International Security Program
"But there are gainsayers, who declare that yet another American military intervention in the Arab world is nothing but counterproductive. Indeed, some Arab commentators see the intervention in Libya as a new manifestation of a colonialism returning to the Arab world, and this is certainly there as an undercurrent in Arab public opinion. But we should never lose sight of the fact that it was this ubuesque Colonel Gaddafi who brought us PAN AM 103 over Lockerbie (1988) and UTA 772 over Niger (1989)."
Spring/Summer 2011
"Preventing the Unthinkable"
Journal Article, Journal of International Security Affairs, issue 20
By Kevin Ryan, Director, Defense and Intelligence Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
During the Cold War, the threat of a nuclear attack came mainly from the U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals, writes Kevin Ryan. Today, however, the United States and Russia have been forced to adapt to a new nuclear threat—that of dedicated terrorists with money and technological access who seek to obtain and use a nuclear device.
Summer 2011
"What Role Should the U.S. Play in Middle East?"
Newsletter Article, Belfer Center Newsletter
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School, Nicholas Burns, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics, Harvard Kennedy School, Ashraf Hegazy, Former Executive Director, The Dubai Initiative, Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor and Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs; Faculty Chair, International Security Program
The Belfer Center's Graham Allison, Nicholas Burns, Ashraf Hegazy, Joseph S. Nye, and Stephen Walt consider the U.S.'s shifting foreign policy in the Middle East.
April 29, 2011
"Wishful Thinking"
Op-Ed, Foreign Policy
By Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs; Faculty Chair, International Security Program
"A central tenet of both neo-conservatism and liberal internationalism/interventionism is the idea that democracy is both the ideal form of government but also one that is relatively easy to export to other societies. Never mind that democratization tends to shift the distribution of power within different societies, thereby provoking potentially violent struggles for power between different ethnic or social groups within society. Pay no attention to the fact that it took several centuries for stable democracies to emerge in the Western world, and that process was frequently bloody and difficult."
March 28, 2011
"France Seizes Moment in Libya"
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
By Juliette Kayyem, Lecturer in Public Policy
"With France as the unstated leader, the Mediterranean Union is also animated by a hope to stabilize the region, improve it economically and thus slow the flow of illegal Arab immigration, and provide an alternative to extremism and terrorism. A modern and open Libya, brought to the world by France, would be a major step toward a new European center of gravity, mainly France."
March 11, 2011
"Forging New Ground with No-fly Zone"
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
By Juliette Kayyem, Lecturer in Public Policy
"The case study we do not have is whether a no-fly zone will aid rebel leaders in deposing a tyrannical leader in a predominantly ground combat civil war where the United States has a strong preference for who should lose, but almost no idea who the winners are. This is new territory."
Spring 2011
"The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics: A Neorealist Synthesis"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 35
Realist scholars have long debated the question of how much power states need to feel secure. Offensive realists claim that states should constantly seek to increase their power. Defensive realists argue that accumulating too much power can be self-defeating. Proponents of hegemonic stability theory contend that the accumulation of capabilities in one state can exert a stabilizing effect on the system. The three schools describe different points along the power continuum. When a state is weak, accumulating power increases its security. This is approximately the situation described by offensive realists. A state that continues to accumulate capabilities will eventually triggers a balancing reaction that puts its security at risk. This scenario accords with defensive realist assumptions. Finally, when the state becomes too powerful to balance, its opponents bandwagon with it, and the state’s security begins to increase again. This is the situation described by hegemonic stability theory. These three stages delineate a modified parabolic relationship between power and security. As a state moves along the power continuum, its security increases up to a point, then decreases, and finally increases again. This modified parabolic relationship allows scholars to synthesize previous realist theories into a single framework.
Spring 2011
"Europe's Troubles: Power Politics and the State of the European Project"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 35
By Sebastian Rosato, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2005–2006
The 1990s were years of great optimism in Europe. As the Europeans were putting the finishing touches on their economic community, observers predicted that political and military integration would soon follow. Optimism has turned to pessimism since the turn of the century, however. Most analysts believe that the economic community is in crisis, and hardly anyone predicts the creation of a political or military counterpart to it. Why has the European project run into trouble and what does the future hold? The answers to these questions are largely to be found in the distribution of power. It was the overwhelming power of the Soviet Union that drove the Western Europeans to consider a variety of integration initiatives and to build and maintain the European Community (EC) during the Cold War. In 1991 the collapse of the Soviet Union deprived them of a compelling geostrategic reason to pursue further integration or even to preserve their economic community. As a result, the Europeans have made no real effort to establish a political or military community over the past two decades, and the EC has slowly started to fray. As long as there are no significant changes in the balance of power going forward, worse times lie ahead.
January 2, 2011
"Rumours of U.S. Decline are Greatly Exaggerated"
Op-Ed, Toronto Star
By Thomas M. Nichols, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2011
"The continuing warnings about American decline represent a kind of atavistic Cold War mindset, in which every military advance in another nation is by definition a threat to the United States and its allies. Have we become so accustomed to our great fortune that economic or military developments in countries that have not yet completely mastered basic human services like clean water, literacy and roads represent our own 'decline'?"
December 10, 2010
Danish Defense Minister argues for greater civil-military integration in Afghanistan
News
By Cathryn Clüver, Executive Director, The Future of Diplomacy Project
The military option in Afghanistan is losing time, Gitte Lillelund Bech said. Joint civilian and military capacity building is essential and a precondition of a hand-over to local forces.
