KYOTO PROTOCOL AND POST-KYOTO OPTIONS
2009
"Sectoral Approaches for a Post-2012 Climate Regime: A Taxonomy"
Journal Article, Climate Policy, issue 6, volume 9
By Jonas Meckling, Research Fellow, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements and Gu Yoon Chung
Sectoral approaches have been gaining currency in the international climate debate as a possible remedy to the shortfalls of the Kyoto Protocol. Proponents argue that a sector-based architecture can more easily invite the participation of developing countries, address competitiveness issues, and enable immediate emissions reductions. However, given the numerous proposals, much confusion remains as to what sectoral approaches actually are. This article provides a simple, yet comprehensive, taxonomy of the various proposals for sectoral approaches.
November 2009
"Climate Finance"
Policy Brief
By The Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
The finance of climate mitigation and adaptation in developing countries represents a key challenge in the negotiations on a post-2012 international climate agreement. Finance mechanisms are important because stabilizing the climate will require significant emissions reductions in both the developed and the developing worlds, and therefore large-scale investments in energy infrastructure. The current state of climate finance has been criticized for its insufficient scale, relatively low share of private-sector investment, and insufficient institutional framework. This policy brief presents options for improving and expanding climate finance.
October 23, 2009
"Three Pillars of Post-2012 International Climate Policy"
Policy Brief
By Sheila M. Olmstead, Former Research Fellow, Environment and Natural Resources Program, 2001–2002 and Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
Our proposal for a post-2012 international global climate policy agreement contains three essential elements: meaningful involvement by key industrialized and developing nations; an emphasis on an extended time path of targets; and inclusion of market-based policy instruments. This architecture is consistent with fundamental aspects of the science, economics, and politics of global climate change.
October 19, 2009
"A Portfolio of Domestic Commitments: Implementing Common but Differentiated Responsibilities"
Policy Brief
By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
An effective, but more flexible and politically palatable approach could be an international agreement on a "portfolio of domestic commitments." Under such an agreement, nations would agree to honor commitments to greenhouse gas emission reductions laid out in their own domestic laws and regulations. A portfolio of commitments may emerge from a global meeting such as the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, or a smaller number of major economies could negotiate an agreement among themselves, and then invite other countries to join.
October 2009
"The São Paulo Proposal for an Agreement on Future International Climate Policy"
Discussion Paper
By Erik Haites, Farhana Yamin and Niklas Höhne
The São Paulo Proposal is designed to create a stable, long-term, universal regime based on the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Such a regime is required to encourage the technological change and structural shifts necessary to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations. Richer countries adopt binding targets that become more stringent over time. Financial and institutional provisions to enhance developing country implementation of mitigation and adaptation actions are strengthened.
October 14, 2009
Harvard Project Conducts Roundtable Workshop in Brussels, Hosted by the European Union Commissioner for Environment
Highlight
By Robert C. Stowe, Executive Director, Harvard Environmental Economics Program; Manager, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
The Harvard Project conducted a roundtable workshop on September 30, 2009, hosted by European Union Commissioner for Environment Stavros Dimas and titled "Post-2012 Climate Change Policy: Insights from the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements". Commissioner Dimas and Robert Stavins, Director of the Harvard Project, spoke, respectively, on the status of European Union (EU) and U.S. climate change policy.
September 21, 2009
"Yes: The Transition Can Be Gradual—and Affordable"
Op-Ed, Wall Street Journal
By Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
"...[T]he U.S. and China have been involved in intense talks about climate policy. If the two nations come together in a bilateral agreement—a real possibility—they would have much more leverage to persuade other major nations to join. From there, developing nations could be brought on board by giving them targets that reduce emissions without stifling growth. Advanced nations might agree to more-severe emissions cuts and allow developing nations to make gradual cuts in the early decades as they rise toward the world's average per-capita emissions. With the right incentives, developing countries can and will move onto less carbon-intensive growth paths."
September 2009
"Global Climate Policy Architecture and Political Feasibility: Specific Formulas and Emission Targets to Attain 460 PPM CO2 Concentrations"
Discussion Paper
By Valentina Bosetti and Jeffrey Frankel, James W. Harpel Professor of Capital Formation and Growth
This paper offers a framework of formulas that produce precise numerical targets for emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) in all regions of the world in all decades of this century. The formulas are based on pragmatic judgments about what is possible politically. The reason for this approach is the authors' belief that many of the usual science-based, ethics-based, and economics-based paths are not politically viable. It is not credible that successor governments will be able to abide by the commitments that today’s leaders make, if those commitments would be costly.
September 20, 2009
"The Essential Pillars of a New Climate Pact"
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
By Sheila M. Olmstead, Former Research Fellow, Environment and Natural Resources Program, 2001–2002 and Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
THE climate change summit at the United Nations on Tuesday is aimed to build momentum for the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen in December, where nations will continue negotiations on a successor to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which expires in 2012. To be successful, any feasible successor agreement must contain three essential elements: meaningful involvement by a broad set of key industrialized and developing nations; an emphasis on an extended time path of emissions targets; and inclusion of policy approaches that work through the market, rather than against it.
September 2009
"An Expanded Three-Part Architecture for Post-2012 International Climate Policy"
Discussion Paper
By Sheila M. Olmstead, Former Research Fellow, Environment and Natural Resources Program, 2001–2002 and Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
The major features of a post-2012 international global climate policy architecture are described with three essential elements: a means to ensure that key industrialized and developing nations are involved in differentiated but meaningful ways; an emphasis on an extended time path of targets; and inclusion of flexible market-based policy instruments to keep costs down and facilitate international equity. This architecture is consistent with fundamental aspects of the science, economics, and politics of global climate change; addresses specific shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol; and builds upon the foundation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
