KYOTO PROTOCOL AND POST-KYOTO OPTIONS
September 20, 2009
"The Essential Pillars of a New Climate Pact"
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
By Sheila M. Olmstead, Former Research Fellow, Environment and Natural Resources Program, 2001–2002 and Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
THE climate change summit at the United Nations on Tuesday is aimed to build momentum for the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen in December, where nations will continue negotiations on a successor to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which expires in 2012. To be successful, any feasible successor agreement must contain three essential elements: meaningful involvement by a broad set of key industrialized and developing nations; an emphasis on an extended time path of emissions targets; and inclusion of policy approaches that work through the market, rather than against it.
September 2009
"An Expanded Three-Part Architecture for Post-2012 International Climate Policy"
Discussion Paper
By Sheila M. Olmstead, Former Research Fellow, Environment and Natural Resources Program, 2001–2002 and Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
The major features of a post-2012 international global climate policy architecture are described with three essential elements: a means to ensure that key industrialized and developing nations are involved in differentiated but meaningful ways; an emphasis on an extended time path of targets; and inclusion of flexible market-based policy instruments to keep costs down and facilitate international equity. This architecture is consistent with fundamental aspects of the science, economics, and politics of global climate change; addresses specific shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol; and builds upon the foundation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
September 2, 2009
"Technology in the UN Climate Change Negotiations: Moving Beyond Abstraction"
Policy Brief
This brief considers the technology negotiations of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) within the wider context of low-carbon energy technology. In doing so, it focuses on how technology issues can be effectively embedded within a potential agreement at the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) in Copenhagen. The paper asserts that the negotiations must be conducted with cognizance of national decision-making processes and competing priorities. It puts forth a series of framing topics in order to more explicitly explore the large technology "ecosystem". It concludes that the most appropriate area for international cooperation on technology under the UNFCCC lies in the direct provision of human and institutional capacity building with a focus on the least developed countries.
September 2009
Post-Kyoto International Climate Policy: Summary for Policymakers
Book
By Joseph Aldy, Former Co-Director, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements and Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government; Member of the Board; Director, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
This volume is a highly topical contribution to climate policy debates that offers options, based on cutting-edge social-science research, for an international climate change regime to succeed the Kyoto Protocol when it expires in 2012. It distils key findings from the Harvard Project into an easy reference for policymakers, journalists, and stakeholders.
August 27, 2009
"Rules for Negotiating and Updating Climate Treaties"
Policy Brief
By Bard Harstad
A climate treaty is characterized by a large number of parameters: What should the abatement or emission levels be? How should the burden to abate be distributed across countries? What should the time profile for the emission levels be? Should there be issue linkages with other policy areas? Should there be any side transfers between some countries and, if so, what should the transfers be? This richness in parameters implies that there is a lot to decide and negotiate before the final climate treaty is ready.
Moreover, there is great uncertainty regarding the future costs and benefits of abatement. Today, it is not yet known how much abatement will be desirable in the future. This means that any climate treaty must be updated, or renegotiated, quite frequently in the coming years. The realized climate policies depend on future international negotiations—and the rules governing these.
August 2009
"Options for Reforming the Clean Development Mechanism"
Policy Brief
By The Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)—established by the Kyoto Protocol of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change—is an emissions offset program that allows industrialized countries to receive credits for funding emissions reduction projects in developing countries. The program is intended to provide a cost-effective way for industrialized countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, while at the same time supporting sustainable development in developing countries. However, the CDM has been criticized for its lengthy and expensive project approval procedures, its exclusion of many categories of potentially important mitigation activities, and its methodologies for calculating whether projects actually reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In response to these problems, this Issue Brief presents a variety of options for reforming the CDM.
August 7, 2009
"Climate change requires an energy technology revolution, Chu says"
News
By Beth Maclin, Communications Assistant
Secretary of Energy Steven Chu discussed the need for an aggressive national energy policy at a packed John F. Kennedy Jr. Forum event, “Laying the Foundation for the Next Generation of Clean Energy Jobs,” on August 6, 2009. He outlined challenges of global warming and potential strategies that could provide solutions.
August 5, 2009
"A Proposal for a Global Upstream Emission Trading System (UGETS)"
Policy Brief
By Akinobu Yasumoto and Mutsuyoshi Nishimura
An effective policy approach to climate change would be a global emission trading system. Opinions differ, however, as to what approach should be pursued when fostering a global emissions trading system. Many argue in favor of linking various national and regional emission trading systems as a possible way forward. However, an alternative method, which involves developing a new system from the ground up, could prove more advantageous. Under an Upstream Global Emission Trading System (UGETS), all nations would use an upstream emissions trading system that would result in far fewer monitoring points than a downstream system. A nation would only need to keep track of domestic shipments and imports of fossil fuels.
August 3, 2009
"Gore's Carbon 'Tax Shift' Beats Cap-and-Trade"
Op-Ed, Roll Call
By Elaine Kamarck, Lecturer in Public Policy
"At the core of the cap-and-trade approach is a new financial market in carbon permits. The economics of a cap mean that permit prices will be very volatile, inviting a frenzy of financial speculation by Wall Street. As Americans suffer through the worst recession in their lifetimes, they will find it hard to trust the fate of the planet to the same individuals who brought us credit default swaps, subprime mortgage securities and other exotic financial instruments."
July 2009
"The Dynamics of Climate Agreements"
Discussion Paper
By Bard Harstad
This paper provides a novel dynamic model of private provision of public goods. The agents can also invest in cost-reducing technologies but, nevertheless, the Markov-Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) is unique and the analysis tractable. The non-cooperative outcome is compared to scenarios where the agents can contract on contributions investment), and the optimal contract is derived.
While the model fits a variety of contexts, the policy implications for climate agree- ments are particularly important. Environmental agreements (e.g. the Kyoto protocol) are typically specifying emissions but not investments in technology, since such e¤orts would be hard to verify. They often have a limited time horizon and future commitments remain to be negotiated.
