NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AP Photo
September 23, 2008
"U.S., Russia Must Unite to Lessen Nuclear Dangers"
Op-Ed, The Washington Times
By Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
Martin Malin argues in an Op-Ed for the Washington Times, that as the presidential nominees' debate on national security issues approaches, there is one issue on which both sides agree — preventing nuclear terrorism and proliferation must be a top priority.
AP Photo
September 2008
The Next Chapter
Report
By Xenia Dormandy, Senior Associate, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
The Belfer Center's Xenia Dormandy participated in the Pakistan Policy Working Group, which was convened in January 2008 to assess the state of U.S.-Pakistan relations and to offer ideas to the next U.S. President and his Administration on managing this critical partnership.
August 28, 2008
"Historic Barriers to Anglo-American Nuclear Cooperation"
Book Chapter
By Andrew Brown, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom
Andrew Brown's chapter, "Historic Barriers to Anglo-American Nuclear Cooperation," has been published in the recent book US-UK Nuclear Cooperation After 50 Years. The book is a joint publication from CSIS and Chatham House London examining the impact of the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement and its consequences.
August 22, 2008
Memo to President-elect McBama
Memorandum, Aspen Strategy Group
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School
Graham Allison writes in a memo to a fictional President-elect McBama on the suject of nuclear terrorism, "You pledged that you would make preventing this catastrophe an organizing principle of your administration. This memo provides a brief outline of strategy and organization to fulfill that promise."
AP Photo
August 18, 2008
"Musharraf Exit May Affect U.S. Plans"
Media Feature
By Xenia Dormandy, Senior Associate, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Xenia Dormandy, Director of the Project on India and the Subcontinent, was interviewed for National Public Radio's All Things Considered on the impact of Musharraf's resignation for U.S. foreign policy.
August 14, 2008
"Strengthening our Strategy Against WMD"
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
By Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities and The Honorable Robert G. Joseph, Senior Scholar, National Institute for Public Policy
Dr. Ashton B. Carter and Ambassador Robert G. Joseph discuss recommendations stemming from recommendations in final report of the review they co-chaired of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and other DOD efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction.
July 2008
"Denuclearization of the DPRK—A Role for the United Nations?"
Paper, volume 3
By Xiaohui (Anne) Wu, Associate, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"The denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to be a source of considerable international concern. Yet, no coherent international framework has emerged to deal with this challenge in parallel with the regional mechanism of the six-party talks. With the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference set for 2010, appropriately addressing the DPRK nuclear issue is being identified as essential to maintaining the strength of the NPT. Can the United Nations (UN) afford to take a back seat in attempts at resolution?This article examines the potential of, and prospects for, an active UN role in facilitating Pyongyang's denuclearization process. Anne Wu's paper examines the potential of, and prospects for, an active UN role in facilitating Pyongyang's denuclearization process."
AP Photo
July 19, 2008
"Bush's U-turn Toward Common Sense"
Op-Ed, Los Angeles Times
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School
Graham Allison applauds the decision by the Bush administration to send U.S. Undersecretary of State William Burns to the European Union meeting with Iran on Saturday (July 19). This "flip-flop toward reality," Allison says, "represents a major step in overcoming fierce internal struggles within the U.S. and Iran that had left both stuck at stalemate."
Summer 2008
"The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s—A Research Note"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 33
By Pavel Podvig
The Soviet strategic modernization program of the 1970s was one of the most consequential developments of the Cold War. Deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles and the dramatic increase in the number of strategic warheads in the Soviet arsenal created a sense of vulnerability in the United States that was, to a large degree, responsible for the U.S. military buildup of the late 1970s and early 1980s and the escalation of Cold War tensions during that period. U.S. assessments concluded that the Soviet Union was seeking to achieve a capability to fight and win a nuclear war. Estimates of missile accu¬racy and silo hardness provided by the U.S. intelligence community led many in the United States to conclude that the Soviet Union was building a strategic missile force capable of destroying most U.S. missiles in a counterforce strike and of surviving a subsequent nuclear exchange. Soviet archival documents that have recently become available demonstrate that this conclusion was wrong. The U.S. estimates substantially overestimated the accuracy of the Soviet Union's missiles and the degree of silo reinforcement. As the data demonstrate, the Soviet missile force did not have the capability to launch a successful first strike. Moreover, the data strongly suggest that the Soviet Union never attempted to acquire a first-strike capability, concentrating instead on strategies based on retaliation.
Summer 2008
"Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 33
By William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova
Although projections of nuclear proliferation abound, they rarely are founded on empirical research or guided by theory. Even fewer studies are informed by a comparative perspective. The two books under review—The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy, by Jacques Hymans, and Nuclear Logics: Alternative Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, by Etel Solingen, are welcome exceptions to this general state of affairs, and represent the cutting edge of nonproliferation research. Both works challenge conventional conceptions of the sources of nuclear weapons decisions and offer new insights into why past predictions of rapid proliferation failed to materialize and why current prognoses about rampant proliferation are similarly flawed. While sharing a number of common features, including a focus on subsystemic determinants of national behavior, the books differ in their methodology, level of analysis, receptivity to multicausal explanations, and assumptions about decisionmaker rationality and the revolutionary nature of the decision. Where one author emphasizes the importance of the individual leader’s national identity conception in determining a state’s nuclear path, the other explains nuclear decisions primarily with regard to the political-economic orientation of the ruling coalition. Notwithstanding a tendency to overinterpret evidence, the books represent the best of contemporary social science research and provide compelling interpretations of nuclear proliferation dynamics of great relevance to scholars and policymakers alike.
