November 19, 2013
Op-Ed, Agence Global
By Rami Khouri, Senior Fellow, Middle East Initiative
We should be cheering the fact that the American and Iranian foreign ministers are now trading accusations in public about who is to blame for the lack of a full agreement in last week’s Geneva negotiations on the issues of Iran’s nuclear industry and the UN and American sanctions on Iran. It is so much healthier to have the foreign ministers exchanging ideas of how to reach a negotiated agreement than to have them threaten each other with more sanctions and faster development of nuclear capabilities.
November 15, 2013
Op-Ed, American Interest
By Chuck Freilich, Senior Fellow, International Security Program
"The Obama administration maintains that the sanctions relief offered in exchange was limited and would not have undermined the basic sanctions regime, which has had a devastating effect on Iran's oil exports and access to the international financial system. It also argues, correctly, that a negotiated deal is preferable to the alternatives and the best outcome for all parties concerned, Israel and Saudi Arabia included."
November 6, 2013
Op-Ed, Washington Post
By David Ignatius, Senior Fellow, Future of Diplomacy Project
As the Obama administration moves into a decisive stage of nuclear negotiations with Iran, officials are considering a two-step process that would begin with a freeze and modest rollback of Iranian enrichment of uranium, matched by a limited easing of U.S.-led economic sanctions on Tehran.
November 2, 2013
The Syrian chemical weapons dismantlement and negotiations with Iran could serve as catalysts for renewed optimism on the viability of the establishment of the WMD-free zone. On the diplomatic front, the designated Finnish facilitator for the Middle East WMD-Free Zone Conference, Undersecretary of State Jaakko Laajava, undertook consultations in Switzerland on Oct. 21, in an attempt to find agreement between regional parties on convening it. The fruitfulness of the consultations — surprisingly attended by all regional parties — indeed constitutes an encouraging step toward the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.
November 1, 2013
How significant is the proposal for a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, given the violence and turmoil rocking the region? The short essays in this discussion paper, by experts from across the region, provide a snap shot of the diversity of views on the issue. As a collection, the essays demonstrate the scale and complexity of the challenges associated with establishing a WMD-free zone in the region. The gaps between the positions of key parties are clearly evident; but the reader will also find unexpected commonalities.
Journal Article, International Security, issue 2, volume 38
By Campbell Craig, Benjamin H. Friedman, Brendan Rittenhouse Green, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2009–2011, Justin Logan, Stephen Brooks, Former Fellow, International Security Program, 2003-2004, G. John Ikenberry and William Wohlforth, Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
Campbell Craig and Benjamin H. Friedman, Brendan Rittenhouse Green, and Justin Logan respond to Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth's Winter 2012/2013 International Security article, "Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment."
"Smashing Atoms for Peace: Using Linear Accelerators to Produce Medical Isotopes without Highly Enriched Uranium"
By David Nusbaum, Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
Accelerators can eventually be substituted for nuclear research reactors for the production of medical isotopes and for neutron-based research and other applications. The use of accelerators would reduce dependence on HEU and decrease the resulting risks. The United States and other countries should work together to provide the funding and exchange of information and ideas needed to speed up the development, demonstration, and deployment of technically and economically viable accelerator technologies to substitute for research reactors.
By Eugene B. Kogan, Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
The U.S. achieved nonproliferation success against Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s by forcing this highly dependent ally to accept intrusive on-site inspections that stopped its nuclear work. Taiwan depended on the U.S. for its very survival....Repeated military punishment threats against Taiwan's security (threat to abandon) and civilian nuclear program failed to change this ally's determination to acquire nuclear weapons. Success was achieved thanks to coercion by denial and dismantlement that uncovered and stopped Taipei's nuclear work.
October 16, 2013
Viktor Yesin analyzes important nuances in the behavior and thinking of the American and Soviet leaders during the Cuban Missile Crisis, building upon an evolving body of work surrounding the events of October, 1962.
Foreword by Graham Allison and Andrei Kokoshin.
October 13, 2013
Op-Ed, Moscow Times, issue 5233
Earlier this year, an 83-year-old Catholic nun, Sister Megan Rice, was convicted of breaking into the Y-12 National Security Complex near Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where the U.S. stores weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium. Sister Rice and two senior citizen companions cut through three fences before vandalizing the outside of the storage site. Fortunately, they were peace activists and not terrorists bent on causing mayhem, but this appalling lapse proves that no nation can be complacent about securing its nuclear materials.