US PRIMACY
Spring 2011
"The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics: A Neorealist Synthesis"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 35
Realist scholars have long debated the question of how much power states need to feel secure. Offensive realists claim that states should constantly seek to increase their power. Defensive realists argue that accumulating too much power can be self-defeating. Proponents of hegemonic stability theory contend that the accumulation of capabilities in one state can exert a stabilizing effect on the system. The three schools describe different points along the power continuum. When a state is weak, accumulating power increases its security. This is approximately the situation described by offensive realists. A state that continues to accumulate capabilities will eventually triggers a balancing reaction that puts its security at risk. This scenario accords with defensive realist assumptions. Finally, when the state becomes too powerful to balance, its opponents bandwagon with it, and the state’s security begins to increase again. This is the situation described by hegemonic stability theory. These three stages delineate a modified parabolic relationship between power and security. As a state moves along the power continuum, its security increases up to a point, then decreases, and finally increases again. This modified parabolic relationship allows scholars to synthesize previous realist theories into a single framework.
AP Photo
Spring 2011
"The Right to Be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 35
By Peter D. Feaver, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1985-1987; Editorial Board Member, Quarterly Journal: International Security
President George W. Bush’s Iraq surge decision in late 2006 is an interesting case for civil-military relations theory, in particular, the debate between professional supremacists and civilian supremacists over how much to defer to the military on decisions during war.
Spring 2011
"Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 35
By Paul MacDonald, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2006-2008 and Joseph M. Parent
There is broad scholarly consensus that the relative power of the United States is declining and that this decline will have negative consequences for international politics. This pessimism is justified by the belief that great powers have few options to deal with acute relative decline. Retrenchment is seen as a hazardous policy that demoralizes allies and encourages external predation. Faced with shrinking means, great powers are thought to have few options to stave off decline short of preventive war. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, retrenchment is not a relatively rare and ineffective policy instrument. A comparison of eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 demonstrates that great powers frequently engage in retrenchment and that retrenchment is often effective. In addition, we find that prevailing explanations overstate the importance of democracies, bureaucracies, and interest groups in inhibiting retrenchment. In fact, the rate of decline can account for both the extent and form of retrenchment, even over short periods. These arguments have important implications for power transition theories and the rise of China.
AP Photo
November/December 2010
"The Future of American Power"
Journal Article, Foreign Affairs
By Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
It is currently fashionable to predict a decline in the United States' power. But the United States is not in absolute decline, and in relative terms, there is a reasonable probability that it will remain more powerful than any other state in the coming decades.
AP Photo
October 2010
"American and Chinese Power after the Financial Crisis"
Journal Article, Washington Quarterly, issue 4, volume 33
By Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
"...Asia has its own internal balance of powers, and in that context, many states continue to welcome an American presence in the region. Chinese leaders have to contend with the reactions of other countries, as well as the constraints created by their own objectives of economic growth and the need for external markets and resources. Too aggressive a Chinese military posture could produce a countervailing coalition among its neighbors that would weaken both its hard and soft power. A poll of 16 countries around the world found a positive attitude toward China’s economic rise, but not its military rise."
AP Photo
Fall 2010
"The Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf: An Iranian View"
Journal Article, Middle East Policy, issue 3, volume XVII
By Kayhan Barzegar, Former Associate, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program, 2010–2011; Former Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/international Security Program, 2007–2010
"...[W]hile the traditional form of balance of power between Iran and Iraq provided security for the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, it favored the interests of foreign actors, especially the United States. Proponents of such a view hold that following the overthrow of the Baathist regime in Iraq and the growth of Iran's role and influence in the region, the international community ought to establish a new kind of balance of power to restrain the Islamic Republic of Iran, and thereby preserve the security of the region. Following its failure to redefine the position of the new Iraq in terms of a new balance of power, the United States has itself tried to play such a role in the region. U.S. efforts to minimize Iran's role within the context of the new balance of power have consequently created another security dilemma in the Persian Gulf."
AP Photo
Forthcoming Summer 2010
"Space, Stability and Nuclear Strategy: Rethinking Missile Defense"
Journal Article, China Security, issue 2, volume 6
By Joan Johnson-Freese and Thomas M. Nichols, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2008–2011
"...[T]he United States has spent several tens of billions of dollars on missile defense research-and yet China, Iran, North Korea and possibly others have continued to pursue increasingly effective long-range ballistic capabilities. If missile defenses are a deterrent, why do US competitors-to say nothing of outright enemies-seem undeterred?"
AP Photo
Summer 2010
"Perpetuating U.S. Preeminence: The 1990 Deals to “Bribe the Soviets Out” and Move NATO In"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 35
By Mary Elise Sarotte, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1997–1999
Washington and Bonn pursued a shared strategy of perpetuating U.S. preeminence in European security after the end of the Cold War. As multilingual evidence shows, they did so primarily by shielding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from potential competitors during an era of dramatic change in Europe. In particular, the United States and West Germany made skillful use in 1990 of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's political weakness and his willingness to prioritize his country's financial woes over security concerns. Washington and Bonn decided "to bribe the Soviets out," as then Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates phrased it, and to move NATO eastward.
AP Photo
Summer 2010
"Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 35
By Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson
Scholars often interpret balance of power theory to imply that great powers almost always balance against the leading power in the system, and they conclude that the absence of a counterbalancing coalition against the historically unprecedented power of the United States after the end of the Cold War is a puzzle for balance of power theory. They are wrong on both counts. Balance of power theory is not universally applicable.
AP Photo
July/August 2010
"A Special Relationship in Jeopardy"
Journal Article, American Interest, issue 6, volume V
By Eric S. Edelman, Senior Associate, International Security Program
"...[A]ll this shows is that a special relationship need not be an antiseptically harmonious and boring one to still be special. On the contrary: What is special, and atypical, is that the relationship has grown rather than suffered from its conflicts. The "long wait" in the nuclear domain was punctuated by a generous British offer of bases for U.S. B-29 bombers and culminated in unprecedented and intensified cooperation in the nuclear arena. Suez precipitated the "golden days" of the Anglo-American relationship under Macmillan, Eisenhower and Kennedy. The twin crises over the Falklands and Grenada did not prevent George Shultz from concluding that the Reagan-Thatcher relationship was "as close as any imaginable between two major leaders." The disputes over Bosnia presaged a deep cooperation in the Kosovo War. One need not look at the "special relationship" through a Panglossian lens to conclude that it has been real and durable, and has made an enormous contribution to the successful conclusion of the Cold War and the effort at maintaining international order in a disorderly post–Cold War world."
