NUCLEAR STOCKPILE SECURITY
November 2009
"Beyond Zero Enrichment: Suggestions for an Iranian Nuclear Deal"
Policy Brief
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
"Some form of negotiated agreement, if it can be achieved, is the “least bad” option for U.S. interests—but is likely to have to include some continuing enrichment in Iran. There are real security risks in agreeing to permit some ongoing enrichment in Iran, but if appropriately managed, these security risks are less than those created by a military strike or allowing Iran to continue unfettered enrichment with no agreement."
November, 2009
Strategies for Acquiring Foreign Nuclear Assistance in the Middle East: Lessons from the United Arab Emirates
Working Paper
By Bryan Early, Research Fellow, The Dubai Initiative
The path to acquiring a peaceful civilian nuclear program is fraught with challenges for countries in the Middle East. Given Israel's proactive policies in preventing the proliferation of its neighbors and nuclear supplier states' consternation about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, Arab states face a number of unique obstacles in acquiring foreign nuclear assistance. Yet as the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) recent success in courting the assistance of a number of nuclear supplier states demonstrates, these obstacles are not insurmountable. This piece explores the UAE's strategies in obtaining foreign nuclear assistance to uncover the generalizable insights that may be of use to other Middle Eastern countries seeking to develop peaceful nuclear programs.
October 13, 2009
"U.S., Russia Must Lead on Arms Control"
Op-Ed, Politico
By General Brent Scowcroft, Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor, R. Nicholas Burns, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics and Strobe Talbott
"The Nobel Peace Prize Committee cited Obama's dedication to arms control and nonproliferation when announcing last Friday his selection as this year's laureate. If he creates a positive, mutually reinforcing dynamic in the way he presents and sequences the two treaties [NPT and CTBT], it will give momentum and coherence to follow-on negotiations and the agreements that they produce."
August 13, 2009
"Pakistan's Nukes are Safe. Maybe."
Op-Ed, Foreign Policy
By Vipin Narang, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"...[T]he primary risk to the Pakistani Army's ability to safely secure nuclear assets in its custody would likely be during crisis scenarios — either against India or due to a perceived Western threat to the integrity of Pakistan's arsenal — that might cause Pakistan to move to a higher state of nuclear readiness. If the Army feels compelled to rapidly disperse or relocate nuclear components and loses the defensive advantage of protecting them in secure fixed locations, insider foreknowledge of movements and the loss of centralized control could increase the probability of theft or loss...."
August 7, 2009
"The Armageddon Test"
Discussion Paper
By Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
How much nuclear material has leaked, and is it in the hands of terrorists, in storage somewhere, or still in circulation? No one knows for sure, but the task of cleaning up the nuclear black market amounts to an Armageddon test for global intelligence. The standard for success is unforgiving: all nuclear material must be recovered before it finds its way into an improvised nuclear device.
July 7, 2009
"Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Securing Pakistani Nuclear Weapons"
Testimony
By Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
"The problem is not the quality of Pakistan's nuclear security efforts. The problem is that the standard for success is so unforgiving. In a world in which terrorists are actively seeking weapons of mass destruction, there can be no breakdown in security that enables terrorists to obtain a nuclear bomb."
July 1, 2009
"Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Terrorism"
Magazine or Newspaper Article, Arms Control Today
By Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
"The greatest threat of a loose nuke scenario stems from insiders in the nuclear establishment working with outsiders, people seeking a bomb or material to make a bomb. Nowhere in the world is this threat greater than in Pakistan."
Spring 2009
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy
Report
By Dr. William J. Perry, Former Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project and General Brent Scowcroft
Perry and Scowcroft chaired the Council on Foreign Relations independent task force on U.S. nuclear weapons policy. The final report of the task force is provided here.
May 28, 2009
"North Korea won't fire nuke ... but could sell one to Osama"
Op-Ed, The Sun
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School
"The challenge for President Obama, Prime Minister Brown, members of the UN Security Council and the international community is to convince Kim Jong-il that he faces disastrous consequences."
Summer 2009
"Center Scholars Offer Advice on Future of U.S.-Russia Relations"
Newsletter Article, Belfer Center Newsletter
By Beth Maclin, Communications Assistant
Belfer Center Director Graham Allison, with members of the Bipartisan Commission on U.S. Policy towards Russia, met in March with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and high-level officials in the Obama administration to discuss the future of U.S.-Russia relations.
