January 25, 2013
Op-Ed, Washington Post
By David Ignatius, Senior Fellow, Future of Diplomacy Project
"Chuck Hagel means it when he describes himself as an “Eisenhower Republican.” He kept a bust of President Dwight Eisenhower in his Senate office for a dozen years and has a portrait of Ike on the wall of his current office at Georgetown University.
But the most compelling evidence of Hagel’s fascination is that he purchased three dozen copies of an Eisenhower biography and gave copies to President Obama, Vice President Biden and then-Defense Secretary Bob Gates, according to the book’s author, David Nichols," writes David Ignatius in The Washing Post.
March 6, 2013
By Tytti Erästö, Former Research Fellow and Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2012–2014
"The problem is that, from an Iranian perspective, recent offers fail to suggest that the zero enrichment demand would not be reasserted; sanctions continue to be based on it and the P5+1 continue to refuse to recognize Iran's right to enrichment. The resulting vagueness about end goals is reinforced by the absence of any apparent intention to lift the tightening Western sanctions as part of a potential nuclear deal."
March 6, 2013
Op-Ed, Los Angeles Times
By Hui Zhang, Senior Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
"From China's perspective, the crisis is driven by Washington and Pyongyang. North Korea is unlikely to give up its nuclear ambitions until it gets from the U.S. what it covets most: a reliable security assurance. This would mean an end to Washington's pursuit of regime change. If Washington does not move in this direction, Pyongyang will continue to escalate the crisis. Any resolution of the impasse has to address the reasonable security concerns of North Korea."
February 20, 2013
Op-Ed, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
"While concern for North Korea's push to become a relevant nuclear power is warranted, it is equally important to recognize the very serious technical issues that have plagued Pyongyang's efforts to date. Building a nuclear weapon and its delivery system, and then keeping them operational for the long term is hard—even harder for those states attempting to do it under the umbrella of international sanctions and monitoring."
February 7, 2013
Op-Ed, Washington Post
By Richard Clarke, Faculty Affiliate, Project on Technology, Security, and Conflict in the Cyber Age
"Like-minded nations should also agree that governments should not steal data from private corporations and then give that information to competing companies, as the government of China has been doing on a massive scale. The victims of Chinese economic espionage should seek to establish clear guidelines and penalties within the World Trade Organization system or, if China blocks that, victim states should seek to develop countermeasures and sanctions outside of that structure."
By Bard Harstad
Climate policy is complicated. For a treaty to be beneficial, one must think through carefully how it will work, once it is implemented. Crucial questions include the following: How should an international treaty be designed? Should one negotiate commitments for a five-year period, or for much longer? Assuming that the treaty specifies aggregate or country-specific emission caps, what should these caps be and how should they change over time? How should the agreement be updated once policymakers, scholars, and the public learn more about the severity of the climate-change problem, or about the effects of the policy? Can the treaty be designed to encourage investments in "green" abatement technology or renewable energy sources? Finally, how can one motivate countries to participate and comply with such an agreement?
January 29, 2013
Op-Ed, Christian Science Monitor
By Mahsa Rouhi, Former Associate, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2011–2013; Former Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow, 2010–2011
"The foundations of a Turkey-Japan negotiation with Iran have been laid in decades of dialogue with Tehran and long-established relations focused on energy supplies. Most important, Turkey and Japan continue to maintain strong trade relations with Tehran, which allows them to include economic incentives in a potential proposal. The P5+1 cannot offer such incentives unless they lift a number of sanctions, which seems highly unlikely at the first stage."
By John S. Park, Faculty Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
John S. Park, Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Project on Managing the Atom Associate, argues that cooperation between North Korea and Iran has been a critical—yet underexamined—enabler of North Korea's recent success. He concludes that the time has come for the United States to view the two previously independent missile programs as two sides of the same coin and recommends strategies for disrupting the procurement channels between Iran and North Korea.
December 3, 2012
Op-Ed, The Korea Herald
In addition to the festering territorial row over Korea's easternmost islets of Dokdo, historical issues such as Japan's wartime sexual enslavement have overshadowed the prospect of the two countries' cooperation on security and other issues. Diplomatic tension is expected to escalate further as security hawk Shinzo Abe of the Liberal Democratic Party is likely to return to Japan's premiership following the parliamentary elections slated for Dec. 16.
November 1, 2012
Op-Ed, The Boston Globe
By Eliot A. Cohen, Eric S. Edelman, Former Senior Associate, International Security Program, May 2009–June 2013 and Meghan L. O'Sullivan, Jeane Kirkpatrick Professor of the Practice of International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
"Because of the last four years, we face a world in which our enemies do not fear us, our friends do not believe they can trust us, and those who maneuver between the two camps feel that they will not get in trouble by crossing us. It is time, and more than time, to choose a different course."