IRAN -- NUCLEAR PROGRAM
November 2009
"Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation"
Working Paper
By Matthew Kroenig, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Kroenig examines the effect of the spread of nuclear weapons on international politics. He proposes a theory of nuclear proliferation that examines the differential effects of nuclear proliferation. Kroenig argues that the threat nuclear proliferation poses to a particular state depends on that state’s ability to project military power. This article contributes to our understanding of the consequences of nuclear proliferation and contains important implications for nuclear nonproliferation policy.
AP Photo
November 20, 2009
"Why Israel is Safer (from Iran) Than it Might Seem"
Op-Ed, The Huffington Post
By Azeem Ibrahim, Research Fellow, International Security Program
Most of the arguments that Iran is a threat to Israel center around Iranian President Ahmadinejad's anti-Semitism and holocaust denial. But he does not make Iranian foreign policy, Khameini does. Khameini has been in office since 1989, throughout the period of relative detente with the West during Khatami's presidency, and through the violent and volatile Ahmadinejad years. Yes, there is evidence that Khameini is a tyrant comfortable sanctioning violence to hold onto power in Iran; no, there is no evidence that he is a psychopath whose hatred of Israel would drive him to order the murder of millions. Yes, there is evidence that he sanctions the sponsorship of anti-Israel terrorism to increase his influence in the region, but no, there is no evidence that he values a confrontation with Israel the reprisal from which would inevitably cause Iranian casualties and threaten the regime's already weak power structure (from within even if not from without).
AP Photo
November 2009
"Beyond Zero Enrichment: Suggestions for an Iranian Nuclear Deal"
Policy Brief
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
"Some form of negotiated agreement, if it can be achieved, is the “least bad” option for U.S. interests—but is likely to have to include some continuing enrichment in Iran. There are real security risks in agreeing to permit some ongoing enrichment in Iran, but if appropriately managed, these security risks are less than those created by a military strike or allowing Iran to continue unfettered enrichment with no agreement."
AP Photo
November 1, 2009
"A Middle Way, Best Solution to Nuclear Crisis"
Op-Ed, Iran Review
By Kayhan Barzegar, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
"Although it is difficult under the current circumstances to predict Iran's response to the agreement, but all signs point to a middle way, which if chosen carefully, could be positive and in line with Iran's national interests. In fact, if Iran kept part of the enriched uranium in the country and sent the rest to another country, it would pave the way for the continuation of cooperation."
November, 2009
Strategies for Acquiring Foreign Nuclear Assistance in the Middle East: Lessons from the United Arab Emirates
Working Paper
By Bryan Early, Research Fellow, The Dubai Initiative
The path to acquiring a peaceful civilian nuclear program is fraught with challenges for countries in the Middle East. Given Israel's proactive policies in preventing the proliferation of its neighbors and nuclear supplier states' consternation about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, Arab states face a number of unique obstacles in acquiring foreign nuclear assistance. Yet as the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) recent success in courting the assistance of a number of nuclear supplier states demonstrates, these obstacles are not insurmountable. This piece explores the UAE's strategies in obtaining foreign nuclear assistance to uncover the generalizable insights that may be of use to other Middle Eastern countries seeking to develop peaceful nuclear programs.
AP Photo
October 13, 2009
"U.S., Russia Must Lead on Arms Control"
Op-Ed, Politico
By General Brent Scowcroft, Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor, R. Nicholas Burns, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics and Strobe Talbott
"The Nobel Peace Prize Committee cited Obama's dedication to arms control and nonproliferation when announcing last Friday his selection as this year's laureate. If he creates a positive, mutually reinforcing dynamic in the way he presents and sequences the two treaties [NPT and CTBT], it will give momentum and coherence to follow-on negotiations and the agreements that they produce."
AP Photo
October 13, 2009
"Obama's Nuclear Agenda"
Op-Ed, Daily News Egypt
By Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
"So long as the world remains a dangerous place with several nuclear weapons states, Obama must reassure its allies about the credibility of American guarantees of extended deterrence. Otherwise, reductions that create anxieties in other countries could lead them to develop their own weapons and thus increase the number of nuclear weapons states."
AP Photo
October 2009
"Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace"
Discussion Paper
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom and Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007-2008
When do states attack or consider attacking nuclear infrastructure in nonnuclear weapons states? Despite the importance of this question, relatively few scholarly articles have attempted to identify the factors that lead a state to attack another state's nuclear facilities. This paper conducts the first large-n analysis on when states use force as a way to control proliferation.
This paper challenges existing arguments that states are deterred from attacking nuclear programs by the prospect of a military retaliation from the proliferating state or concerns about international condemnation. Instead, it finds that states are more likely to attack nuclear programs when they believe that the proliferating state might use nuclear weapons or engage in other offensive behavior. States are willing to accept substantial costs in attacking if they believe that a particular country's acquisition of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat to their security.
AP Photo
October 1, 2009
Obama’s opportunity in Iran
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
By R. Nicholas Burns, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics
The Obama administration faces a daunting set of barriers to diplomatic progress today as the United States holds the first serious talks between Washington and Tehran in 30 years.
AP Photo
July 2009
"Iran, the Middle East, and International Security"
Journal Article, Ortadogu Etutleri, issue 1, volume 1
By Kayhan Barzegar, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
"In the years since the September 11 attacks and the onset of crisis in Iraq, Iran's consolidation of its political-security role in the Middle East, and its impact upon regional and international security systems has been the focus of attention in international and Middle East security studies. The prevailing view in the West and the Arab world is that new political-security and geopolitical developments have changed the balance in regional power and political structure in favor of Iran. Accordingly, this situation has had negative effects on the United States' strategic interests, its regional allies in the Arab world, and on Israel's position. During recent decades, preserving a 'balance of power' policy between the regional actors has been the basis of American foreign policies in the region, especially in the Persian Gulf. The recent developments have unbalanced power equations in favor of Iran."
