IRAN -- NUCLEAR PROGRAM
November 2009
"Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation"
Working Paper
By Matthew Kroenig, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom
Matthew Kroenig examines the effect of the spread of nuclear weapons on international politics. He proposes a theory of nuclear proliferation that examines the differential effects of nuclear proliferation. Kroenig argues that the threat nuclear proliferation poses to a particular state depends on that state’s ability to project military power. This article contributes to our understanding of the consequences of nuclear proliferation and contains important implications for nuclear nonproliferation policy.
November 1, 2009
"A Middle Way, Best Solution to Nuclear Crisis"
Op-Ed, Iran Review
By Kayhan Barzegar, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
"Although it is difficult under the current circumstances to predict Iran's response to the agreement, but all signs point to a middle way, which if chosen carefully, could be positive and in line with Iran's national interests. In fact, if Iran kept part of the enriched uranium in the country and sent the rest to another country, it would pave the way for the continuation of cooperation."
October 13, 2009
"U.S., Russia Must Lead on Arms Control"
Op-Ed, Politico
By General Brent Scowcroft, Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor, R. Nicholas Burns, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics and Strobe Talbott
"The Nobel Peace Prize Committee cited Obama's dedication to arms control and nonproliferation when announcing last Friday his selection as this year's laureate. If he creates a positive, mutually reinforcing dynamic in the way he presents and sequences the two treaties [NPT and CTBT], it will give momentum and coherence to follow-on negotiations and the agreements that they produce."
October 13, 2009
"Obama's Nuclear Agenda"
Op-Ed, Daily News Egypt
By Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
"So long as the world remains a dangerous place with several nuclear weapons states, Obama must reassure its allies about the credibility of American guarantees of extended deterrence. Otherwise, reductions that create anxieties in other countries could lead them to develop their own weapons and thus increase the number of nuclear weapons states."
October 2009
"Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace"
Discussion Paper
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Affiliate, Project on Managing the Atom and Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007-2008
When do states attack or consider attacking nuclear infrastructure in nonnuclear weapons states? Despite the importance of this question, relatively few scholarly articles have attempted to identify the factors that lead a state to attack another state's nuclear facilities. This paper conducts the first large-n analysis on when states use force as a way to control proliferation.
This paper challenges existing arguments that states are deterred from attacking nuclear programs by the prospect of a military retaliation from the proliferating state or concerns about international condemnation. Instead, it finds that states are more likely to attack nuclear programs when they believe that the proliferating state might use nuclear weapons or engage in other offensive behavior. States are willing to accept substantial costs in attacking if they believe that a particular country's acquisition of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat to their security.
October 1, 2009
Obama’s opportunity in Iran
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
By R. Nicholas Burns, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics
The Obama administration faces a daunting set of barriers to diplomatic progress today as the United States holds the first serious talks between Washington and Tehran in 30 years.
July 2009
"Iran, the Middle East, and International Security"
Journal Article, Ortadogu Etutleri, issue 1, volume 1
By Kayhan Barzegar, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
"In the years since the September 11 attacks and the onset of crisis in Iraq, Iran's consolidation of its political-security role in the Middle East, and its impact upon regional and international security systems has been the focus of attention in international and Middle East security studies. The prevailing view in the West and the Arab world is that new political-security and geopolitical developments have changed the balance in regional power and political structure in favor of Iran. Accordingly, this situation has had negative effects on the United States' strategic interests, its regional allies in the Arab world, and on Israel's position. During recent decades, preserving a 'balance of power' policy between the regional actors has been the basis of American foreign policies in the region, especially in the Persian Gulf. The recent developments have unbalanced power equations in favor of Iran."
September 22, 2009
"Options for Limiting the Security Risks from a Negotiated Nuclear Settlement with Iran"
Presentation
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project
Matthew Bunn considers the premises, facts, and risks underlying negotiation with Iran over their nuclear program. He describes a range of options for limiting the risks of a negotiated settlement with Iran. Bunn suggests that insisting on zero centrifuges is likely to lead to no agreement. It is time to begin thinking about what the lowest risk, non-zero options may look like.
September 17, 2009
"Obama Made the Right Decision on Missile Defense"
Op-Ed, National Review Online
By Thomas M. Nichols, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"Despite the outcry that President Obama has sold out the Europeans and caved to the Russians by cancelling missile defenses in Europe, it was the right thing to do. Those defenses were not going to work (or work well enough or soon enough to matter in any major crisis with Iran), and the diplomatic price we were paying for them was far out of proportion to any small gains we might have made by annoying the Russians or reassuring the Czechs and the Poles...."
Fall 2009
"The Paradox of Iran's Nuclear Consensus"
Journal Article, World Policy Journal, issue 3, volume 26
By Kayhan Barzegar, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
"...[S]ituated in what it sees as a hostile neighborhood, it is hardly surprising that the Iranian government views an independent nuclear fuel cycle as interchangeable with deterrence, rather than as a bid for building a nuclear arsenal. While building a nuclear arsenal would be a costly endeavor, risking international isolation and assuring Iran's 'pariah status,' acquiring civilian nuclear capability would afford Iran the security and psychological edge it has long sought, and at a lower cost."
