IRAN -- NUCLEAR PROGRAM
October 3, 2012
"'Never Again!'"
Op-Ed, The Jerusalem Post
By Chuck Freilich, Senior Fellow, International Security Program
"Then, as now, fanatical leaders called for Jewish extermination, while an irresolute, self-preoccupied West, failed to take effective action. The USA, however, is a very different country from what it was in 1938, and while one can legitimately believe that Obama should take even firmer action, he has done more than any other Western leader."
AP Photo
September 28, 2012
"American President: Out on a Limb"
Op-Ed, The Huffington Post
By Charles G. Cogan, Associate, International Security Program
"So assuming that negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program will resume after the American presidential elections, as most observers think they will, we will have to see if the policy of stiffing the Iranians — who abhor foreign pressure, in view of their both glorious and inglorious past — will continue not to work; or whether U.S. concessions, which have not been forthcoming so far, will dent the ideological obduracy of the Iranian position."
September 2012
Containing Iran: Strategies for Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge
Book
By Robert Reardon, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
This study assesses current U.S. policy options on the Iranian nuclear question. It suggests that U.S. goals can be met through patient and forward-looking policymaking. Specifically, the United States can begin to lay the groundwork for an effective containment policy while continuing efforts to forestall Iranian weaponization. A successful containment policy will promote long-term positive political change in Iran while avoiding counterproductive provocation.
AP Photo
April 2012
"Safe, Secure and Effective Nuclear Operations in the Nuclear Zero Era"
Paper
By Ronald G. Allen, Jr., Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2011–2012
Without significant change in the geopolitical landscape, nuclear weapons will remain a relevant portion of America's long-term national security strategy. Therefore, the burdens and responsibilities of maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent force are paramount to ensure credibility for America and her allies. Bottom line: nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are still relevant today and for the foreseeable future. Therefore, to maintian international strategic stability we must embrace the necessity of nuclear deterrence, develop strategic policy that supports deterrence as an essential element and adequately resource the enterprise.
AP Photo
September 4, 2012
"Can 120 (Non-Aligned) Countries be Wrong?"
Op-Ed, The Huffington Post
By Charles G. Cogan, Associate, International Security Program
"Not particularly relevant during the Cold War, what possibly can the Non-Aligned Movement represent today? The Cold War is over. Has the movement outlived its usefulness? The answer is no, despite the Movement's outmoded Cold War origins. It serves as a rallying point for all those countries who want to push back against what they see as the dominating attitudes and policies of the United States, and to a lesser degree, the West in general."
AP Photo
September 4, 2012
"Too Soon... Too Soon... Too Late!"
Op-Ed, The Jerusalem Post
By Chuck Freilich, Senior Fellow, International Security Program
"If Obama is elected, but maybe not if Romney is, there may still be time for one last diplomatic push, but only if backed up with a clear threat and deadline, and the US should put a far more generous proposal on the table, so that no one can argue that it has not fully tried. Simply strengthening sanctions will no longer cut it, it is too late for that."
AP Photo
August 20, 2012
"Why West Should Curb Hostility To Non-Aligned Summit in Tehran"
Op-Ed, Al-Monitor
By Abbas Maleki, Associate, International Security Program and Kaveh L. Afrasiabi
"...[T]he various implications of the NAM summit and Iran's NAM presidency — for regional stability, conflict mediation and a greater Iranian role as a responsible international actor, among others — need to be taken into consideration in the West, as part and parcel of a more prudent and nuanced Western approach toward Iran, instead of one that is dependent on coercive diplomacy."
AP Photo
August 4, 2012
"Attacking Iran: Lessons from the Iran-Iraq War — Part 2"
Op-Ed, Fair Observer
By Annie Tracy Samuel, Research Fellow, International Security Program
"Like the 1980 Iraqi invasion, an attack will be viewed in Iran as part of a pattern of Western subversion and aggression that links together British and Russian economic exploitation, occupation during World War II, the coup that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq in 1953, and years of support for the Shah's repressive regime. For those in Iran who question the standard narrative of concerted and constant Western aggression, an attack on Iranian territory will dispel any doubt and engender the next generations of Iranians who subscribe to that view."
AP Photo
August 4, 2012
"A Security Guarantee Now"
Op-Ed
By Chuck Freilich, Senior Fellow, International Security Program
"...Israel should explore the possibility of obtaining a U.S. security guarantee that is limited to the Iranian nuclear program (and possibly other existential threats), on the condition that it does not restrict our freedom of maneuver in other areas—or limit our strategic capabilities. These capabilities are the ultimate guarantor of our security and cannot be compromised, indeed, they may be sufficient in themselves to deter Iran. The United States, in any event, which is greatly concerned over the ramifications of an Israeli strike and is doing everything in its power to prevent one, may demonstrate greater openness to the idea than it did in the past...."
AP Photo
July 28, 2012
"Attacking Iran: Lessons from the Iran-Iraq War — Part 1"
Op-Ed, Fair Observer
By Annie Tracy Samuel, Research Fellow, International Security Program
"While the regime may increase its strength in the wake of an attack, it may also be able to capitalize on an attack to eliminate its internal enemies. That is precisely what happened following the 1980 Iraqi invasion. Ayatollah Khomeini and his allies used the war to strengthen their control over the state along the war-making state-making nexus, following the pattern of revolutionary elites in other countries. Their main rival for power within the Islamic Republic was the secular leaning constituency led by President Abolhassan Banisadr, who had tried to gain the support of the regular armed forces and to steer the war effort in his role as commander in chief. To minimize Banisadr's power, Khomeini sent his own representatives to oversee the armed forces, which eroded their support for the president, and built up a competing powerbase in the IRGC."
