IRAN -- NUCLEAR PROGRAM
August 5, 2008
"Stephen M. Walt on the U.S., Iran, and the New Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf"
Q&A
By Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs; Faculty Chair, International Security Program and Kayhan Barzegar, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
Walt: “…..by maintaining a (new) balance you don’t get conflict breaking out and you tilt in favour whichever side seems to be falling behind. At the same time, you do try to discourage conflict whenever possible. You certainly don’t try to control the region yourselves and if the balance breaks down as it did in 1991 and you have to intervene you go in, you get out as quickly as possible. But you don’t try to organize these societies. You don’t try to tell them how to live. You don’t try to tell them how their governments should be organized and you don’t try to transform them at the point of a rifle barrel. This is not disengagement, but it is also not trying to control the region or dictate its political evolution.”
“…we are not going to have a stable long-term situation in the Persian Gulf until the United States and other countries in the region—including Iran—do come to some understanding about the various issues that concern them. Achieving that goal will require genuine diplomacy…The United States will also have to recognize that Iran’s size, potential power, large population, and its geo-strategic location inevitably make it a major player in the security environment in the Persian Gulf, and ignoring that fact is unrealistic…”
AP Photo
August 4, 2008
"After Olmert"
Op-Ed, Human Events
By Chuck Freilich, Senior Fellow, International Security Program
"...In mid September, Olmert's Kadima party will hold primaries to elect his successor as party head, until which time he will stay on as premier. The two leading candidates are, Tzipi Livni, the current foreign minister and clear frontrunner among the public, and Shaul Mofaz, a former chief of staff and defense minister, now minister of transportation, the frontrunner among the party rank and file, who actually vote in the primaries...."
AP Photo
July 19, 2008
"Bush's U-turn Toward Common Sense"
Op-Ed, Los Angeles Times
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School
Graham Allison applauds the decision by the Bush administration to send U.S. Undersecretary of State William Burns to the European Union meeting with Iran on Saturday (July 19). This "flip-flop toward reality," Allison says, "represents a major step in overcoming fierce internal struggles within the U.S. and Iran that had left both stuck at stalemate."
Dean Calma/IAEA
July 12, 2008
IAEA Safeguards: Dealing Preventively with Non-Compliance
Report
Pierre Goldschmidt, former Deputy Director-General for Safeguards at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), outlines a new approach to strengthening the IAEA's hand in cases when states violate their safeguards agreements. Goldschmidt argues that the UN Security Council should pass a generic resolution laying out steps the Security Council would take to deal with any state found to be in violation of its safeguards obligations. Any state which violated its safeguards pact would be required to accept a broader inspection regime going well beyond the Additional Protocol until the IAEA was able to draw the conclusion that all of its nuclear facilities and materials were under safeguards. Goldschmidt offers a draft text for the resolution and for the "Model Temporary Complementary Protocol" that defines the broader inspection regime, along with an article-by-article analysis.
July 11, 2008
"Joseph Nye on Smart Power in Iran-U.S. Relations"
Q&A
By Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor and Kayhan Barzegar, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
This interview elaborates on the applicability of Nye’s theory of “smart power” in the context of the Middle East and particularly Iran. The discussion further pushes the boundaries on how the current U.S policymakers should take into account soft and smart power towards Iran.
Nye: “… if the Americans, in efforts to try to stop the Iranian’s nuclear weapons program, were to bomb nuclear facilities in Iran, they might gain a few years of slowing down the nuclear weapons program but they would lose the whole generation of younger Iranians who would respond in a nationalistic way. So I think that would be a very large cost for a very limited benefit.”
AP photo
Summer 2008
"Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 33
How might Iran retaliate in the aftermath of a limited Israeli or U.S. strike? The most economically devastating of Iran's potential responses would be closure of the Strait of Hormuz. According to open-source order of battle data, as well as relevant analogies from military history and GIS maps, Iran does possess significant littoral warfare capabilities, including mines, antiship cruise missiles, and land-based air defense. If Iran were able to properly link these capabilities, it could halt or impede traffic in the Strait of Hormuz for a month or more. U.S. attempts to reopen the waterway likely would escalate rapidly into sustained, large-scale air and naval operations during which Iran could impose significant economic and military costs on the United States — even if Iranian operations were not successful in truly closing the strait. The aftermath of limited strikes on Iran would be complicated and costly, suggesting needed changes in U.S. force posture and energy policy.
Summer 2008
"Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 33
By William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova
Although projections of nuclear proliferation abound, they rarely are founded on empirical research or guided by theory. Even fewer studies are informed by a comparative perspective. The two books under review—The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy, by Jacques Hymans, and Nuclear Logics: Alternative Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, by Etel Solingen, are welcome exceptions to this general state of affairs, and represent the cutting edge of nonproliferation research. Both works challenge conventional conceptions of the sources of nuclear weapons decisions and offer new insights into why past predictions of rapid proliferation failed to materialize and why current prognoses about rampant proliferation are similarly flawed. While sharing a number of common features, including a focus on subsystemic determinants of national behavior, the books differ in their methodology, level of analysis, receptivity to multicausal explanations, and assumptions about decisionmaker rationality and the revolutionary nature of the decision. Where one author emphasizes the importance of the individual leader’s national identity conception in determining a state’s nuclear path, the other explains nuclear decisions primarily with regard to the political-economic orientation of the ruling coalition. Notwithstanding a tendency to overinterpret evidence, the books represent the best of contemporary social science research and provide compelling interpretations of nuclear proliferation dynamics of great relevance to scholars and policymakers alike.
AP Photo
June 25, 2008
"A Disastrous Attack on Iran?"
Op-Ed, The Jerusalem Post
By Chuck Freilich, Senior Fellow, International Security Program
"...Only if the US proves to both domestic and world opinion that it has exhausted all diplomatic possibilities, will it gain support for major economic sanctions, let alone future military action. Iran will probably reject the offer, as it has all others, but we will only know if the option is pursued and it is a vital way station on the road to stronger measures. Talking to Iran does not imply acquiescence, or appeasement."
AP Photo
June 2008
Military Elements in a Strategy to Deal with Iran's Nuclear Program
Paper
By Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project (on leave), Harvard & Stanford Universities
PDP Co-Director Ashton B. Carter explores military elements in the U.S. strategy for addressing Iran's nuclear program.
AP Photo
April 24, 2008
Case Study: Red Teaming Iran's Supreme Leader
Memorandum
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School
When the key finding of the December National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran was emerging, the intelligence community assigned a group to "red team" Iran's behavior. They were asked to assume that Iran's intention was to deceive the United States into concluding that the Iranian nuclear program had been halted. Although the red team made a persuasive case that Iran's actions were consistent with this objective, the intelligence community ultimately rejected that hypothesis and came to the conclusion it reported.
