CORRUPTION
November, 2009
Securing the Peace: The Battle over Ethnicity and Energy in Modern Iraq
Working Paper
By Justin Dargin, Research Fellow, The Dubai Initiative
This article examines the legal and political impediments to the Kurdish Regional Government's (KRG) exploration and production contracts, which the central government in Baghdad has refused to recognize. The newly established Iraqi national constitution significantly opened as many petroleum-control questions as it resolved. Negotiated in 2005, the constitution not only separated branches of government, but established Federalism as its lodestar. When faced with unresolved issues over regional and national control over petroleum resources, however, International Oil Companies (IOCs) function in an ambiguous legal environment that fails to clearly distinguish between federal and regional powers.
November, 2009
What Accounts for the Success of Islamist Parties in the Arab World
Working Paper
By Michael Robbins, Research Fellow, The Dubai Initiative
Islamist organizations are generally considered to be the strongest and most credible opposition to incumbent regimes throughout the Arab world. Fear of Islamic takeovers has led regimes and other outside powers to justify not holding free elections, citing examples that include the Algerian election of 1991, the Iranian Revolution, the AKP victory in Turkey and the perceived popularity of Islamist opposition groups throughout much of the Arab world (Brumberg 2002). Yet, other analysts have questioned the actual strength of Islamist movements within the Arab world, noting that although Islamists may be the main challenger, few have actually been successful in taking power (Roy 1994).
November, 2009
An Enhanced Engagement Moving Beyond Security Training for the Palestinian Authority
Policy Brief
By Naseem Khuri, Former Executive Director, The Dubai Initiative
As part of its ongoing campaign to facilitate the development of a Palestinian state, the United States has made strides in empowering security forces within the Palestinian Authority (P.A.). Yet without further training in key areas of diplomacy, governance and public communication, the U.S. cannot adequately address growing concerns of factional strife, increased suspicion of trainee behavior in the West Bank and the perception of excessive American interference in internal Palestinian affairs. Beyond ongoing negotiations with Israel and security training, U.S. policy must address core capacity-building needs within the P.A. in its struggle to govern effectively a future Palestinian state.
October 21, 2009
"High Cost, Low Odds"
Op-Ed, Nation
By Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs; Faculty Chair, International Security Program
"...America's odds of winning this war are slim. The Karzai government is corrupt, incompetent and resistant to reform. The Taliban have sanctuaries in Pakistan and can hide among the local populace, making it possible for them simply to outlast us. Pakistan has backed the Afghan Taliban in the past and is not a reliable partner now. Our European allies are war-weary and looking for the exits. The more troops we send and the more we interfere in Afghan affairs, the more we look like foreign occupiers and the more resistance we will face. There is therefore little reason to expect a US victory."
October 11, 2009
"Deciphering the Attack on Pakistan's Army Headquarters"
Op-Ed, Foreign Policy
By Hassan Abbas, Senior Advisor, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
"This was neither the first attack on an army structure in the country nor the most deadly — but it is unprecedented given the extent of the breach of the GHQ security, the confusion that it created in its initial stage (raising concerns about the safety of army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani), and its timing vis-à-vis the planned launch of a ground military operation in South Waziristan. It could be a transformational event for the army — cementing its resolve against local militants, bridging internal divisions and forcing a review of its intelligence estimates. However, jumping to conclusions without a thorough investigation and reacting rashly based on preconceived notions would be highly counterproductive. Additionally, though Pakistan's nuclear installations are not in the immediate vicinity of GHQ, the nature of the attack raises questions about how security agencies would react if a future attack targets any of the nuclear weapons facilities."
August 11, 2009
"How America Is Funding Corruption in Pakistan"
Op-Ed, Foreign Policy
By Azeem Ibrahim, Research Fellow, International Security Program
"For the last eight years, U.S. taxpayers' money has funded hardly any bona fide counterterrorism successes, but quite a bit of corruption in the Pakistani Army and intelligence services. The money has enriched individuals at the expense of the proper functioning of the country's institutions. It has provided habitual kleptocrats with further incentives to skim off the top. Despite the U.S. goal of encouraging democratization, assistance to Pakistan has actually weakened the country's civilian government. And perhaps worst of all, it has hindered Pakistan's ability to fight terrorists."
July 2009
"U.S. Aid to Pakistan—U.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption"
Discussion Paper
By Azeem Ibrahim, Research Fellow, International Security Program
The United States must not provide Pakistani institutions with incentives to act counter to U.S. foreign policy objectives in the future. It has done so in the past. But until the spring of 2009, no comprehensive overview of the full funding to Pakistan was possible as the figures were kept secret. Those figures, as well as a full analysis of what is known about how they were spent, can now be evaluated. The available information paints a picture of a systemic lack of supervision in the provision of aid to Pakistan, often lax U.S. oversight, and the incentivization of U.S. taxpayer–funded corruption in the Pakistani military and security services. The author believes that this is the first attempt to present an overview of U.S. aid to Pakistan since 2001, evaluate it, and present recommendations on how to ensure that mistakes are not repeated and lessons are learned.
July 26, 2009
"US Must Wake Up to Reality in Pakistan"
Op-Ed, The Guardian, Comment is Free...
By Appu Soman, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2007–2009
"The most important non-state actor in Pakistan is the army. Normally, a country's army constitutes its ultimate instrument of legitimate force. But the Pakistani army is independent of the civilian government. It considers its interests as separate from those of this government. It has acted more like a mercenary force, reluctant to assume responsibility for defending the country against internal threats. It maintains links with some of the very elements that threaten the country's security."
June 13, 2009
"The False Unity in Zimbabwe"
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
By Robert Rotberg, Director, Program on Intrastate Conflict and Conflict Resolution
Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai of Zimbabwe, who visited President Obama yesterday, needs all the American support he can get. Although the head of government of an impoverished and beleaguered nation battered by a decade of severe mismanagement and corruption, Tsvangirai is hardly in charge. President Robert Mugabe is still calling too many of the crucial governing shots.
May 21, 2009
"India's New Ruling Caste"
Op-Ed, Guatemala Times
By Appu Soman, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, 2007–2009
"The opportunity for personal gains through public office has made electoral politics an automatic career choice for Indian politicians' progeny. Record numbers of sons and daughters of political leaders and millionaires (and people with criminal backgrounds) contested this election. We are seeing the formation of a new Indian caste — a caste of rulers different from India's traditional Kshatriya caste — before our very eyes."
